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RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS: PENDENT PERSONAL
JURISDICTION AFTER BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB
Louis J. Capozzi III *
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Superior Court of California provides an opportunity to
reexamine pendent personal jurisdiction in the federal courts. There
are two types of pendent personal jurisdiction. The first form,
embraced by federal courts since 1957, is pendent claim personal
jurisdiction: when a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant
as to one anchor claim, it can exercise personal jurisdiction with
respect to related claims that it could not adjudicate in the anchor
claim’s absence. This type is especially common where courts have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant because of a statute with a
nationwide service of process provision, like the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The second type is new. After Bristol-Myers, some
courts have maintained pendent party personal jurisdiction: where a
court has specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to a
particular claim by one plaintiff, it can exercise personal jurisdiction
as to similar claims brought by different plaintiffs.
This Article offers an analytical framework to evaluate the
legitimacy of pendent personal jurisdiction. First, it examines the
doctrine’s history and evolution, ultimately criticizing the federal
courts for expanding their own jurisdiction without articulating a
valid legal warrant. Second, it considers the potential sources of
authority for federal courts to wield pendent personal jurisdiction,
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concluding that all current federal court assertions of pendent
personal jurisdiction depend on state long-arm statutes, as limited by
the Fourteenth Amendment. In the process, this Article seeks to clarify
how the federal courts issue service of process and exercise personal
jurisdiction.
This Article then assesses whether pendent personal jurisdiction
passes muster under the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases. The
Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers, justified by interstate federalism
principles, casts doubt on pendent personal jurisdiction because it
forbids a court from adjudicating claims unconnected to the forum it
sits in. Pendent personal jurisdiction often allows courts to breach that
rule. Therefore, this Article argues that both pendent party and
pendent claim personal jurisdiction are forbidden. This Article also
provides broader insights into personal jurisdiction’s relatedness
element and interstate federalism’s role in limiting the adjudicative
reach of the nation’s courts within a system of multiple sovereigns.
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INTRODUCTION: RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS
Personal jurisdiction has relationship problems. Since the
inception of modern personal jurisdiction doctrine in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 1 the Supreme Court has
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In subsequent decisions, the Court articulated the three prerequisites
to a state’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. First, the defendant must “purposefully
avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Second, the state’s maintenance of specific personal jurisdiction must
be reasonable, accounting for the burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
relief, the forum state’s interest, the interstate judicial system’s interest in the efficient resolution
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frequently revisited it, but has often done more to muddy the
doctrinal waters than clarify them. 2 For over seventy years, the
Court had offered little guidance on one of the three elements
of specific personal jurisdiction: the relatedness element, which
requires that a claim “arise from” the defendant’s contacts with
the forum state.
That changed in June 2017, when the Court handed down its
opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
California—its sixth decision striking down a state court’s
assertion of personal jurisdiction since 2011. 3 Now, a new battle
opens. Although Bristol-Myers firmly established that some
relationship is required between a claim and the defendant’s
forum-state contacts for a court to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction, the Court offered limited instruction on how strong
this relationship must be. Now, litigants are introducing new
strategies to test the outer limits of specific personal
jurisdiction’s relatedness element. One prominent strategy is
this Article’s focus: pendent personal jurisdiction.
Pendent personal jurisdiction is a mysterious doctrine. For
decades, few scholars have considered it, and there is no recent,
authoritative account of what it is or why it exists. 4 Even so,
of disputes, and the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). Third,
the lawsuit must arise from the defendant’s forum-state contacts. See infra Part III.A. This Article
focuses only on the third prerequisite.
2. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Procedure 4(k)(2): A Way to (Partially)
Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413, 414 (2018) (“I am tired of writing
articles complaining about the dismal state of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence—and complain I have.”).
3. See 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (holding that due process did not permit exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction in California as to claims by non-residents); see also BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell,
137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (denying assertion of personal jurisdiction by Montana state court
over FELA claim); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 291 (2014) (denying personal jurisdiction by
Nevada federal court for lack of minimum contacts); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750
(2014) (establishing a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business as the
two standard locations where it is amenable to general personal jurisdiction); Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 930 (2011) (denying general personal jurisdiction
in North Carolina because defendant was not “at home” there); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 909 (2011) (invalidating New Jersey’s assertion of personal jurisdiction
because the defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the forum).
4. Few scholars have written about pendent personal jurisdiction, and most of their accounts
are outdated. One recent, but brief, discussion is given by Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes &
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federal courts have invoked it in hundreds of cases. 5 Indeed,
there are two types of pendent personal jurisdiction. The first,
embraced by federal courts since 1957, is pendent claim personal
jurisdiction: when a court has personal jurisdiction over a
defendant with respect to one claim (the “anchor claim”), it can
exercise pendent personal jurisdiction as to related claims. This
form is especially common in cases involving nationwide
service of process provisions, which courts have interpreted
broadly to allow personal jurisdiction with respect to related
state-law claims. After Bristol-Myers, a growing number of
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 207, 243–44 (2014). No one else has devoted a detailed discussion in an article to pendent
personal jurisdiction within the last fifteen years, even as the Court revolutionized its personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence during that time. Further, pendent party personal jurisdiction has
only truly emerged during the last year. There are a few older accounts, and the great majority
of them defend the doctrine. See Jason A. Yonan, Note, An End To Judicial Overreaching in
Nationwide Service of Process Cases: Statutory Authorization to Bring Supplemental Personal
Jurisdiction Within Federal Courts’ Powers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 559 (concluding “the power to
create [pendent] personal jurisdiction belongs only to Congress and should not be exercised by
courts”); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1619, 1662 (2001) (“[I]n most instances there will be no constitutional or statutory
impediment to the federal court’s exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction . . . .”); Jon Heller,
Note, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 113, 118
(1989) (arguing there are no constitutional or statutory obstacles to pendent personal
jurisdiction); James S. Cochran, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal
Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (1986) (offering a justification for pendent personal
jurisdiction); Steven Michael Witzel, Note, Removing the Cloak of Personal Jurisdiction from Choice
of Law Analysis: Pendent Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 127
(1982) (analyzing pendent personal jurisdiction’s impact on choice-of-law considerations);
Lewis R. Mills, Pendent Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Service Under the Federal Securities Laws, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 423, 446 (1970) (defending pendent personal jurisdiction as consistent with the
federal securities laws); William D. Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts,
11 VILL. L. REV. 56, 79-80 (1965) (arguing pendent personal jurisdiction is not authorized by
statute). A few other scholars mention pendent personal jurisdiction, but do not analyze it in
depth. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 21–22
(2018); Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499,
528–29 (2018); Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1589, 1607–09 (1992).
5. The term “pendent personal jurisdiction” appears in 466 cases in a Westlaw search.
Although some of these cases do not extensively discuss it, some courts use other terms like
“supplemental personal jurisdiction.” This Article focuses on pendent personal jurisdiction in
the federal courts, though most of its arguments apply with equal force to its exercise in state
courts. A small number of state court cases have discussed the doctrine. See, e.g., Ex Parte Dill,
866 So. 2d 519, 538–43 (Ala. 2003) (See, J., dissenting); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, No. Civ.A. 1456-N, 2006 WL 2588971, at *7 n.73 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1,
2006); Swarey v. Stephenson, 112 A.3d 534, 543 n.6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015); Huynh v. Aker
Biomarine Antarctic AS, No. 74241-8-I, 2017 WL 2242299, at *13 (Wash. Ct. App. May 22, 2017).
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courts have maintained pendent party personal jurisdiction:
where a court has specific personal jurisdiction over the
defendant as to a particular claim by one plaintiff, it can wield
pendent personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to similar
claims by different plaintiffs.
However, courts have not paid careful attention to legal
sources of authority when exercising pendent personal
jurisdiction. After concluding that federal law does not
authorize pendent personal jurisdiction, this Article argues that
both state and federal courts wishing to maintain pendent
personal jurisdiction must, under current law, rely on the longarm statutes of the states in which they sit. In most cases,
Congress has not authorized a federal court to exercise more
personal jurisdiction than the state court across the street.
Therefore, although some state long-arm statutes permit the full
extent of personal jurisdiction allowed by the Constitution, the
Fourteenth Amendment limits both state and federal court
assertions of pendent personal jurisdiction.
Applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court’s recent
decision in Bristol-Myers raises questions about the continued
viability of pendent personal jurisdiction. The rule of BristolMyers is that a state court cannot adjudicate a claim
unconnected to it. 6 Because Bristol-Myers limits the scope of
state long-arm statutes, it will have the effect of limiting the
personal jurisdiction of the state and federal courts. Because
pendent personal jurisdiction, by definition, enables courts to
adjudicate claims unconnected to the forum state through an
anchor claim or party, it is forbidden by Bristol-Myers. This
Article challenges the precedents upholding pendent claim and
pendent party personal jurisdiction. The validity of pendent
personal jurisdiction is an urgent question because of the
substantial divisions it has created among the federal courts
within the past year.
Further, the existence of pendent personal jurisdiction
implicates important questions about the Court’s specific
6. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82.
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personal jurisdiction rules. First, what role does interstate
federalism play in personal jurisdiction? The Court’s decision
in Bristol-Myers is rooted in interstate federalism principles that
limit the adjudicative reach of the nation’s courts. At first, it
might seem counterintuitive that the Fourteenth Amendment
functions to police assertions of personal jurisdiction in the
name of interstate federalism. However, examining the
historical development of personal jurisdiction in our federalist
legal system, this Article explains how the Fourteenth
Amendment protects individual liberty by ensuring states do
not reach beyond their sovereignty. Second, is specific personal
jurisdiction a claim-specific inquiry? This Article, drawing on
Bristol-Myers, argues that it must be in order to preserve the line
between specific and general personal jurisdiction. Third, how
related must a claim be to the defendant’s forum-state contacts
to satisfy the relatedness element? Taking a lesson from the
Court’s choice-of-law jurisprudence, this Article suggests that
courts should require some connection, without excessively
policing between potentially competing forums.
Ultimately, this Article seeks to clarify complicated legal
questions, focusing almost exclusively on what the law is and
how it is evolving, as opposed to what the law should be. This
Article proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the history of
pendent personal jurisdiction, explaining how the doctrine
evolved. Part II analyzes the sources of authority for pendent
personal jurisdiction. Although courts have distinguished
between pendent claim personal jurisdiction in nationwide
service of process cases and otherwise, this Article argues that
this distinction is untenable because the relevant nationwide
service provisions cannot be read to permit pendent personal
jurisdiction. 7 Ultimately, after ruling out alternative options, it
concludes that all assertions of pendent personal jurisdiction by
the federal courts currently share the same source of authority:
state long-arm statutes. 8 Part III discusses personal
7. See infra Section II.A.3.
8. See infra Section II.B.
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jurisdiction’s relatedness element, its refinement in BristolMyers, and its inspiration in interstate federalism. Part IV
explores pendent personal jurisdiction’s future, ultimately
concluding that both pendent party and pendent claim personal
jurisdiction are unlawful, but that courts have an alternative
jurisdictional option in some situations where pendent claim
personal jurisdiction has been applied. 9 In short, the
relationship between the federal courts and pendent personal
jurisdiction must end.
I. HISTORY OF PENDENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Imagine the following scenario, similar to a real case. 10 A
California company, Capias Corp, and a Virginia company,
RespondendCo, sign a contract for RespondendCo to provide
Capias with one hundred computers. The companies negotiate
the contract entirely in Virginia. Additionally, RespondendCo
negotiates the same contract with AdCo, an Idaho corporation.
RespondendCo starts complying with the deals, shipping fifty
computers to both of its counterparts. Moreover,
RespondendCo even sends representatives to California to
ensure Capias’s computers are working properly. But, three
months into the deals, RespondendCo reneges on both
obligations to ship fifty additional computers. Thus, Capias and
AdCo withhold payment for the shipments. RespondendCo’s
CEO calls his counterpart at Capias’s California headquarters,
telling him that more computers are on their way, and asks for
advance payment on them. Separately, RespondendCo’s CEO
makes the same call to his counterpart at AdCo. Capias and
AdCo oblige, but no computers ever arrive.
Capias brings fraud and breach of contract claims in a
California federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The
court concludes that it has specific personal jurisdiction as to
the fraud claim, reasoning that RespondendCo intentionally
caused harm within California by inducing Capias to pay for
9. See infra Part IV.
10. Cf. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 1977).
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computers that were never going to arrive. 11 The court,
however, decides that it cannot independently exercise specific
personal jurisdiction as to the breach of contract claim,
reasoning that it did not “arise from” RespondendCo’s
California contacts because the events leading to the contract’s
formation occurred in Virginia. Assuming this conclusion is
right, 12 should the court be able to maintain personal
jurisdiction as to the breach of contract claim? Further, if AdCo
joins with Capias to bring its fraud claim, can the court wield
personal jurisdiction as to AdCo’s claim due to its specific
personal jurisdiction as to Capias’s claim?
Pendent claim personal jurisdiction allows a court, when it
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to an
anchor claim, to maintain personal jurisdiction as to a related
claim it could not otherwise adjudicate. 13 There are two primary
situations in which pendent claim personal jurisdiction has
been relevant. 14 First are the “nationwide service of process
cases,” where the court has jurisdiction over the defendant as to
an anchor claim because of a nationwide service of process
provision—like that governing Clayton Act claims 15—and
exercises personal jurisdiction with respect to related state or
federal claims. Most circuits have blessed pendent claim
personal jurisdiction in these cases. 16 Second, a court can have
11. State long-arm statutes frequently authorize specific personal jurisdiction over
defendants for intentional torts that cause effects in the forum state. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783, 790 (1984).
12. I return later to whether this analysis is right, and its implications for the doctrine of
pendent claim personal jurisdiction. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Rolls-Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 765, 783 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (citing
United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 2002)).
14. Scholars discussing pendent personal jurisdiction have generally split consideration of
the doctrine between “nationwide service of process cases” and those cases where the court has
specific personal jurisdiction under a state long-arm statute as to one claim, but not the other
related ones. See 14a CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1069.7 (4th ed. 2017); Cochran, supra note 4; Rhodes &
Robertson, supra note 4; Simard, supra note 4, at 1627. This Article ultimately rejects this
conceptual distinction, but frames the initial discussion as they did.
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2018).
16. The few scholars who have considered the doctrine’s legitimacy in this context have
usually endorsed it. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14 (not questioning its validity); Dodson,
supra note 4, at 21–22 (arguing that pendent personal jurisdiction has been broadly adopted as
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specific personal jurisdiction as to one anchor claim through a
state long-arm statute, and then wield pendent personal
jurisdiction as to related state or federal claims—as with the
contract claim in our hypothetical. Fewer courts have
recognized pendent claim personal jurisdiction in these cases.
Finally, some courts have embraced a new variant. Pendent
party personal jurisdiction facilitates the joinder of parties with
claims similar to those of an anchor party that brought a claim
the court already had personal jurisdiction over. This
corresponds to AdCo’s fraud claim in our hypothetical. Because
courts first developed the doctrine in nationwide service of
process cases, we will start there.
A. The Rise of Pendent Claim Personal Jurisdiction in Nationwide
Service of Process Cases
The first applications of pendent claim personal jurisdiction
were in nationwide service of process cases. Several federal
statutes, following the lead of the Clayton Act, have provisions
authorizing nationwide service of process for federal claims.17
If the facts underlying a plaintiff’s federal claim under, say, the
Investment Company Act also allow the plaintiff to bring a
state-law fraud claim, can the court exercise personal
jurisdiction as to the pendent state-law fraud claim when it
would not otherwise have personal jurisdiction as to that claim,
but for the Investment Company Act anchor claim? Inspired by
pendent subject matter jurisdiction and the Court’s landmark
decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 18 many courts have
endorsed pendent claim personal jurisdiction in these
nationwide service of process cases.
a doctrine accommodating aggregation in complex litigation); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note
4, at 244 (stating that it is the “nearly unanimous view” of courts that this practice is acceptable);
Simard, supra note 4, at 1636 (analyzing the decisions in several circuits up until 2001 and
asserting that the practice has achieved “considerable acceptance”). But see Yonan, supra note 4,
at 578–79 (arguing that statutory authorization is necessary).
17. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 22. The provision actually authorizes worldwide service of process.
I use the term “nationwide” service of process because the distinction is not particularly
relevant in this Article. For a list, see infra note 185.
18. 383 U.S. 715, 742 (1966).
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The first case where a federal court squarely considered the
merits of pendent claim personal jurisdiction was Schwartz v.
Bowman, where the court rejected the concept. 19 In Schwartz, the
plaintiffs brought a federal shareholder derivative claim under
the Investment Company Act of 1940 and a state-law claim for
breach of fiduciary duty in a New York federal court. 20 The
defendants were served out-of-state in Ohio under the
Investment Company Act’s nationwide service of process
provision. 21 The defendants argued that the court had no
personal jurisdiction over them with respect to the state-law
claim. 22 Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Schwartz countered by
citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurn v. Oursler, a case
that allowed pendent subject matter jurisdiction as to a state-law
claim that was brought with a federal claim. 23 The district court
rejected the plaintiffs’ analogy, stating “it does not follow that,
because a claim is pendent upon a federal claim for the
purposes of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the claim is
pendent for the purposes of jurisdiction over the person.” 24 The
court thus dismissed the plaintiffs’ state-law claims, citing two
reasons in support of its decision. First, the court thought it
lacked statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction. 25 Second,
without detailed explanation, the court asserted that a rule of
pendent personal jurisdiction would inflict “hardship” on the
defendant. 26

19. See 156 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). On appeal, the Second Circuit also considered
pendent personal jurisdiction, albeit in dictum. Judge Clark favored the concept, arguing it was
efficient and imposed no burden on the defendant. See Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195, 198 (2d
Cir. 1959). Judge Moore disagreed, suggesting plaintiffs would abuse such a rule. See id. at 198–
99 (Moore, J., concurring in judgment).
20. See 156 F. Supp. at 362.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 364–65 (citing Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933)).
24. Id. at 365.
25. See id. at 366.
26. Id.
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For about a decade after Schwartz, federal district courts
consistently rejected pendent claim personal jurisdiction. 27 But
starting in the late 1960s, a shift toward acceptance began. For
example, in Townsend Corp. of America v. Davidson—a case
resembling Schwartz—the plaintiffs brought a federal
Investment Company Act claim and a state breach of fiduciary
duty claim in a New Jersey federal court. 28 All defendants were
served outside New Jersey under the Investment Company
Act’s nationwide service of process provision. 29 Opposing
personal jurisdiction over them as to the state-law claims, the
defendants cited Schwartz. 30 But citing “judicial economy and
convenience of the parties,” the court sided with the plaintiffs
and allowed personal jurisdiction as to the state-law claim. 31 In
the following years, several other district courts followed the
lead of the Townsend court. 32
The circuit courts soon joined in. In 1973, the Third Circuit
recognized pendent claim personal jurisdiction in Robinson v.
Penn Central Co., arguing that the justifications for exercising
pendent personal jurisdiction paralleled the considerations
justifying
supplemental
subject
matter
jurisdiction:
“considerations of judicial economy, convenience[,] and
fairness to litigants.” 33 In 1979, the Second Circuit embraced
27. See, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. Colo.
1964) (holding that a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process for Securities
Exchange Act claims did not authorize personal jurisdiction for related state-law
claims); Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 705–06 (D. Mass. 1964); Int’l
Ladies Garment Workers’ Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Phillips
v. Murchison, 194 F. Supp. 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Kappus v. Western Hills Oil, Inc., 24 F.R.D.
123, 127 (E.D. Wis. 1959); Lasch v. Antkies, 161 F. Supp. 851, 852–53 (E.D. Pa. 1958). For a
discussion of these early cases, see Cochran, supra note 4, at 1471–72.
28. 222 F. Supp. 1, 1–2 (D.N.J. 1963).
29. See id. at 2.
30. See id. at 4.
31. See id.
32. See Puma v. Marriott, 294 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (D. Del. 1969); Sprayregen v. Livingston
Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (authorizing pendent personal jurisdiction as to
state-law claim when court had personal jurisdiction from nationwide service of process
provision in federal securities laws); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559,
565–67 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Cooper v. N. Jersey Tr. Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 980–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
33. 484 F.2d 553, 555–56 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966)).
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pendent claim personal jurisdiction on the simple rationale that
the Third Circuit’s view was “better reasoned.” 34 It is worth
noting that in all the preceding cases, the pendent state-law
claim was closely related to the federal claim. Indeed, as some
circuits continued to embrace pendent claim personal
jurisdiction, they added the explicit requirement that the
pendent claim arise from the same nucleus of operative fact as
the anchor claim. 35
In nationwide service of process cases, pendent claim
personal jurisdiction has achieved broad acceptance. Pointing
to earlier precedents as persuasive authority, several other
circuits have adopted pendent claim personal jurisdiction in
such cases, including the Fourth, 36 Seventh, 37 Ninth, 38 Tenth, 39
and Federal Circuits. 40 Federal courts across the country have
continued to apply pendent personal jurisdiction in many
similar nationwide service of process cases up until the present

34. See Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979).
35. See, e.g., Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the
patent statute’s nationwide service of process provision enabled personal jurisdiction as to any
claims that “arose out of the same core of operative fact as those claims that clearly fell within
the scope” of the patent statute); cf. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (“The state and federal claims must
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”).
36. See, e.g., ESAB Grp., Inc., v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that
where a South Carolina federal district court had personal jurisdiction over a New Hampshire
resident because of the federal RICO statute’s provision for nationwide service of process, it
could exercise pendent personal jurisdiction as to New Hampshire state-law claims “so long as
the facts of the federal and state claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact”).
37. See, e.g., Robinson Eng’g Co. Pension Plan & Tr. v. George, 223 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing pendent personal jurisdiction with respect to state-law claims when court had
personal jurisdiction from nationwide service of process under the federal securities laws).
38. See, e.g., Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180–81 (9th
Cir. 2004) (allowing pendent personal jurisdiction as to state-law antitrust claims when the court
had jurisdiction as to the Clayton Act anchor claim through a nationwide service provision).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Pendent
personal jurisdiction . . . exists when a court possesses personal jurisdiction over a defendant
for one claim, lacks an independent basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant for
another claim that arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, and then, because it possesses
personal jurisdiction over the first claim, asserts personal jurisdiction over the second claim.”).
40. See, e.g., Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (upholding pendent
personal jurisdiction as to a state breach of contract claim that arose from the same nucleus of
operative fact as a federal patent claim with a nationwide service of process provision).
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day, and several have applied it since Bristol-Myers. 41 So far, no
circuit has since reconsidered its cases in this area.
B. Pendent Claim Personal Jurisdiction Beyond Nationwide Service
of Process Cases
What about when a court has specific personal jurisdiction as
to one claim through a state long-arm statute–with no
nationwide service of process provision in play—but not as to
other related claims? For an example, recall the fraud and
breach of contract claims in our ongoing hypothetical. Even
though both claims arose from the same business relationship,
our hypothetical court concluded only the fraud claim was
sufficiently connected to California, and that the breach of
contract claim did not arise from RespondendCo’s California
contacts. Assuming that’s right, the question is whether a
California court could adjudicate the two claims together
anyway. Usually, these cases arise in the context of diversity
jurisdiction, though it is also possible for the court to have
specific personal jurisdiction over one federal claim, but not
related federal or state-law claims. 42 Courts have divided on the
doctrine’s validity in this context.
Several federal courts have embraced pendent claim personal
jurisdiction outside the nationwide service of process context.
41. See, e.g., Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co, 16-cv-6496 (LAK), 2018 WL 6169313, at *58
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018) (exercising pendent personal jurisdiction as to state-law claims where
plaintiffs had anchor claims under the Clayton Act); Hosp. Auth. of Metro. Gov’t of Nashville
v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., No. 3:15-1100, 2017 WL 6381434, at *3–4 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 14, 2017)
(recognizing validity of pendent claim personal jurisdiction with anchor claim under the
Clayton Act); Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, No. 16-4001, 2017 WL 3822727, at *3–4 (D. Minn.
Aug. 30, 2017) (exercising pendent claim jurisdiction as to related state-law claims when it had
jurisdiction over defendant as to RICO claim under the RICO statute); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.,
252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 154–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (exercising pendent claim personal jurisdiction as
to related state-law claims when the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant for a
claim under the Anti-Terrorism Act).
42. See, e.g., Noble Sec., Inc. v. MIZ Eng’g, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 2d 513, 553–56 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(exercising pendent claim personal jurisdiction as to a federal Lanham Act claim through a
federal RICO claim); Alcohol Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Actsoft, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1253
(D. Colo. 2010) (exercising pendent claim personal jurisdiction as to direct patent infringement
claims through related indirect patent infringement claims); Miller Pipeline Corp. v. British Gas
Plc., 901 F. Supp. 1416, 1423 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (holding pendent claim personal jurisdiction applies
to related federal claims in addition to related state-law claims).
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The first appellate court to do so was the Second Circuit in
Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc. 43 Hargrave involved a dispute
between a New York vineyard and Oki Nursery, a California
provider of grape vines that allegedly sold bad vines to
Hargrave. 44 Hargrave brought a New York fraudulent
misrepresentation claim and five contract law claims against
Oki in a New York federal court, invoking diversity
jurisdiction. 45 The court, finding that Oki targeted New York
and externally caused harm within the state, held that specific
personal jurisdiction existed as to the fraudulent
misrepresentation claim. 46 The court then allowed pendent
claim personal jurisdiction as to the five contract claims. 47 In
justifying its decision, the court reasoned that the same policy
considerations supporting pendent subject matter jurisdiction
favored pendent claim personal jurisdiction. 48 In an interesting
interpretive move (analyzed in more detail below), the court
interpreted the diversity statute—28 U.S.C. § 1332—to
authorize pendent personal jurisdiction. 49
Since then, several other courts have applied pendent
personal jurisdiction in such cases. 50 Even after Bristol-Myers,
43. 636 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1980).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 899–900.
47. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 1981).
48. See id. at 720.
49. See id. at 719.
50. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Mackzilla, L.L.C., H-15-2425, 2016 WL 1059529, at *6
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2016) (“[T]he use of pendent personal jurisdiction may be equally or even
more justified in some diversity cases than in federal question cases with a mix of federal and
state law claims.”); Inspirus, L.L.C. v. Egan, No. 4-11-CV-417-A, 2011 WL 4439603, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 20, 2011) (allowing pendent claim personal jurisdiction as to two state-law claims the
court did not independently have personal jurisdiction for when it had personal jurisdiction as
to a related breach of contract claim); Pension Advisory Grp. Ltd. v. Cty. Life Ins. Co., 771 F.
Supp. 2d 680, 695–96 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Rosenburg v. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1037 (N.D. Wash. 1999); Anderson v. Century Prods. Co., 943 F. Supp. 137 (D.N.H. 1996)
(holding that pendent personal jurisdiction allowed the court to exercise personal jurisdiction
as to contract claim in case where the court had specific personal jurisdiction with respect to a
related tort claim); Salpoglu v. Widder, 899 F. Supp. 835 (D. Mass. 1995) (exercising pendent
personal jurisdiction as to a breach of contract claim when the court already had jurisdiction
from a malpractice claim); Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 763 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(exercising personal jurisdiction as to retaliatory discharge and defamation claims because the
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courts have applied pendent claim personal jurisdiction outside
the nationwide service of process context. 51
Other courts have declined to apply pendent personal
jurisdiction in the absence of a nationwide service of process
provision. The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected it in Seiferth v.
Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., where the plaintiff brought tort
claims against Camus, a Tennessee engineer, in a Mississippi
federal court under diversity jurisdiction. 52 Seiferth was the
victim of a helicopter accident in Mississippi. Camus had
designed the defective part in Florida, but he installed it in
Mississippi. 53 The plaintiff’s estate brought four claims against
Camus: defective design, failure to warn, negligence, and
negligence per se. 54 After concluding it had specific personal
jurisdiction as to the failure to warn, negligence, and negligence
per se claims, the court also reasoned that the defective design
claim did not “arise out of” Camus’s contacts with
Mississippi. 55 The court confronted as an issue of “first
impression” whether “specific jurisdiction is a claim-specific
inquiry.” 56
The court answered this question affirmatively, rejecting
pendent personal jurisdiction and dismissing the defective
design claim. 57 It reasoned that its conclusion “flow[ed]
logically from the distinction between general and specific
jurisdiction.” 58 It then rejected pendent personal jurisdiction,
asserting that “[p]ermitting the legitimate exercise of specific
court had specific personal jurisdiction as to the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim); Home
Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (D. Mass. 1988) (“[I]n
a multi-count complaint, if a court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to
one count, it has personal jurisdiction with respect to all counts . . . .”).
51. See Hicks v. Jayco, Inc., 1:16 CV1236, 2018 WL 1363843, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2018);
Doe v. Cotterman, No. 17 C 58, 2018 WL 1235014, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2018); Knowledge
Based Sols., Inc. v. Renier, 2017 WL 3913129, at *9–11 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2017); Miller v. Native
Link Constr., LLC., No. 15-1605, 2017 WL 3536175, at *29 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017).
52. See 472 F.3d 266, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2006).
53. See id. at 270.
54. See id. at 274.
55. Id. at 275–76.
56. Id. at 274.
57. See id. at 275-75.
58. See id. at 274.
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jurisdiction over one claim to justify the exercise of specific
jurisdiction over a different claim that does not arise out of or
relate to the defendant's forum contacts would violate the Due
Process Clause.” 59 The Fifth Circuit did not engage with
precedents from other circuits, like Hargrave, that had embraced
the doctrine.
Several other federal courts have declined to extend pendent
claim personal jurisdiction beyond the nationwide service of
process context. 60
C. Pendent Party Personal Jurisdiction
As discussed below, the Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers
limits a court to adjudicating claims connected with the forum
where it sits. Sensing an opportunity, class action defendants
around the country facing claims by out-of-state plaintiffs
moved to dismiss them for lack of personal jurisdiction, citing
the Court’s decision. Dozens of courts have addressed these
motions, and they are deeply divided on the scope of BristolMyers. Some have granted dismissal, reasoning that the Court
requires a connection between each claim and the forum state
for personal jurisdiction to exist. Others have denied the
motions. Some cases invoke the doctrine of pendent party
59. See id. at 275.
60. See, e.g., Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2001) (declaring the district
court must find that personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant as to each of the plaintiff’s
claims); Philips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999)
(“Questions of specific jurisdiction are always tied to the particular claims asserted.”); MG
Design Assocs. v. CoStar Realty Info. Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1016–23 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (looking
at personal jurisdiction separately for all claims); Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc. v. Anchorage
Advisors, LLC., No. 3-11-CV-1416-PK, 2012 WL 3637551, at *9 (D. Or. July 9, 2012) (rejecting
pendent personal jurisdiction because it would “effectively swallow the distinction between
general and specific personal jurisdiction”); Figawi, Inc. v. Horan, 16 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77–78 (D.
Mass. 1998) (refusing to apply pendent personal jurisdiction and rejecting the analogy to subject
matter jurisdiction); Milford Power Ltd. P’ship v. New Eng. Power Co., 918 F. Supp. 471, 479–
80 (D. Mass. 1996) (refusing to consider personal jurisdiction as to claims that did not arise from
the defendant’s forum-state contacts even though plaintiff met burden with respect to other
claims in the same controversy); see also Simard, supra note 4, at 1641–42 (discussing Milford and
Figawi). Remick means the Third Circuit is the only circuit that accepts pendent personal
jurisdiction in the context of a federal claim with a nationwide service of process statute,
Robinson v. Penn Central Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555–56 (3d Cir. 1979), but rejects it otherwise. See
Remick, 238 F.3d at 255. This Article will explore whether this distinction withstands scrutiny.
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personal jurisdiction by name (analogizing to pendent claim
personal jurisdiction in the process). 61 Others courts have not,
but have reasoned that they can adjudicate the claims of
plaintiffs unrelated to the state they sit in because they have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to another plaintiff’s
similar claim. In other words, they are effectively exercising
pendent party personal jurisdiction.
These courts have advanced three rationales. First, some
courts conclude that Bristol-Myers only applies to state courts,
not federal ones. Second, some courts concede that Bristol-Myers
applies to federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, but
maintain it is irrelevant to courts exercising federal question
jurisdiction. Third, some courts acknowledge that Bristol-Myers
applies to federal courts, but not to class actions. The division
between these courts is stark.
1. Division on whether Bristol-Myers applies to federal courts
An example of the first camp is Sloan v. General Motors LLC,
where a federal court wielded pendent party personal
jurisdiction after concluding Bristol-Myers does not apply to
federal courts. 62 California plaintiffs brought a putative class
action for design defects in cars purchased in California under
both state and federal law. General Motors did not question the
court’s personal jurisdiction as to the claims of the California
plaintiffs. 63 Plaintiffs from four other states also sought to bring
the same claims arising from purchases in their respective
states. 64 Even though the court acknowledged those claims had
no “independent relationship” with the defendant’s California
contacts, it exercised personal jurisdiction as to them. 65 The
court acknowledged that its decision stood in tension with
Bristol-Myers, but determined that the Court’s reasoning only
61. See, e.g., Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 858–59 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Allen
v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279, 2018 WL 6460451, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018).
62. See 287 F. Supp. 3d at 858–59.
63. See id. at 853.
64. See id. at 856.
65. See id. at 857–58.
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applied to state courts, not federal courts, because of its
emphasis on interstate federalism. 66 The court reasoned that,
especially since it had federal question jurisdiction because of
the plaintiffs’ Magnuson Moss Warranty Act claims, “the due
process analysis does not incorporate the interstate sovereignty
concerns that animated Bristol-Myers and which may be
‘decisive’ in a state court’s analysis.” 67 In somewhat confused
reasoning, the court then stated the plaintiffs’ claims must still
relate to the defendant’s contacts with California, and
acknowledged they did not. 68 However, citing the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Action Embroidery, the court reasoned the
jump from pendent claim to pendent party personal jurisdiction
was not significant. 69 The court also cited the case’s status as a
putative class action, impliedly recognizing that nationwide
class actions would not be possible against defendants in states
where they are not amenable to general personal jurisdiction
without pendent party personal jurisdiction. 70
However, several other courts have concluded that BristolMyers does govern federal courts, not just the state courts. For
example, in Muir v. Nature’s Bounty (DE), Inc., an Illinois federal
court considered state-law claims by plaintiffs from California,
Michigan, and Pennsylvania who sought to join with Illinois
plaintiffs in alleging consumer fraud against Nature’s Bounty,
a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
New York. 71 Although the court had specific personal
jurisdiction as to the claims of the Illinois plaintiffs (who bought
their products in Illinois), it decided it lacked personal
66. See id. at 858–59.
67. Id. at 859.
68. See id. at 859–60. Logically, if Bristol-Myers only applied to state courts, then a relation
between each claim and the forum state when a federal court exercises personal jurisdiction
should not be necessary.
69. See id. at 860 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit did not limit its holding in Action Embroidery to
situations involving the same parties. Rather, it focused on whether the new claims arose out of
the same nucleus of operative facts, not whether the claims belonged to the same plaintiffs.”).
70. See id. at 861 (“[T]his is a putative nationwide class action. The Court may well have
jurisdiction over absent class members (including the named out-of-state plaintiffs) who are
non-forum residents in any event.”).
71. See No. 15 C 9835, 2018 WL 3647115, at *1 (N.D. Ill. August 1, 2018).
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jurisdiction as to the out-of-state claims because of BristolMyers. 72 The plaintiffs argued for pendent party personal
jurisdiction (citing old pendent claim personal jurisdiction
cases), but the court concluded Bristol-Myers prohibited that. 73
The court first acknowledged the argument for not extending
Bristol-Myers, which reversed a state court judgment:
Arguably, the interstate federalism concerns
underlying [Bristol-Myers] play out differently in
federal court, where it is the coercive power of the
United States, rather than the coercive power of
another state, to which a defendant is asked to
submit. So long as a defendant has sufficient contacts
with the United States, the Constitution might not
prohibit . . . pendent personal jurisdiction. 74
However, the court explained that it was bound by BristolMyers because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
federal courts to rely on state law, thus subjecting them to the
constitutional limits on state courts articulated in BristolMyers. 75 It also noted that several other courts have performed
the same analysis. 76 Outside the class-action context, several
other district courts have considered pendent party personal
jurisdiction and refused to embrace it. 77
72. Id. at *5.
73. See id. at *4.
74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. See id. at *5.
76. See id. at *4–5.
77. See, e.g., Roy v. Fed-Ex Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-30116-KAR, 2018 WL
2324092, at *11 (D. Mass. May 22, 2018) (dismissing out-of-state unpaid overtime claims brought
under the FLSA); Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-cv-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL 1942525, at
*14–16 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018) (dismissing out-of-state claims brought under Age Discrimination
in Employment Act); BeRousse v. Janssen Research & Dev., LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00716-DRH, 2017
WL4255075 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) (dismissing out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims); Spratley v. FCA
U.S. LLC, 3:17-CV-0062, 2017 WL 4023348, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2017). Several cases predated Bristol-Myers. See Famular v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 CV 944 (VB), 2017 WL 2470844, at *5–6
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2017); DeMaria v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 15 C 3321, 2016 WL 374145 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 1, 2016); Tulsa Cancer Inst., PLLC v. Genentech Inc., No. 15-CV-157-TCK-TLW, 2016
WL 141859 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 2016).
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2. Division on whether Bristol-Myers applies in diversity and
federal question cases
Another rationale suggests that Bristol-Myers does not apply
to courts exercising federal question jurisdiction. For example,
in In re Packaged Seafood Products Antitrust Litigation, a California
federal court considered antitrust claims against an
international company only subject to general personal
jurisdiction in the United Kingdom. 78 The court had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to a putative class
of direct purchasers under the Clayton Act’s nationwide service
of process provision. Stating the obvious, the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction as to those claims arose from a federal
question. But the court then questioned whether it could
exercise pendent personal jurisdiction as to the out-of-state
indirect purchaser claims brought under state law. The court
acknowledged a “general consensus [that] because BristolMyers dealt with limits on state sovereign power within a
federal system, its reasoning is applicable to federal courts
sitting in diversity.” 79
But the court reasoned that the “due process concerns are
different” when a federal court is exercising federal question
jurisdiction. 80 Because it was exercising federal question
jurisdiction as to the direct purchaser claims, the court reasoned
that pendent party personal jurisdiction as to the out-of-state
indirect purchaser claims was appropriate, given that they
arose from the same alleged antitrust conspiracy as the federal
direct purchaser claims, enabling the court to adjudicate all the
claims before it. 81 Although they did not rely on this rationale,
a couple of other courts have suggested agreement that BristolMyers does not apply to federal question jurisdiction cases. 82
78. No. 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD), 2018 WL 4222506, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018).
79. See id. at *32.
80. See id.
81. See id. (citing policy advantages such as judicial economy, avoidance of piecemeal
litigation, and overall convenience of the parties).
82. See Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 859 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (noting that the
court had federal question jurisdiction under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act to strengthen

236

DREXEL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:215

Other courts have relied on Bristol-Myers to dismiss claims
while exercising federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, the logic
of these cases closely resembles that in the cases where federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction rejected pendent
personal jurisdiction. For example, in Roy v. FedEx Ground
Package System, Inc., a Massachusetts district court dismissed
out-of-state claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
for lack of personal jurisdiction. 83 The court cited the rule that
“before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant in a federal question case, there must be
authorization for service of summons on the defendant” in state
law or a specific federal statute. 84 Because the FLSA did not
authorize service of process, the court relied on Massachusetts’s
long-arm statute to wield personal jurisdiction, thus bringing
Bristol-Myers (which limits the reach of the long-arm statute)
into play. 85 Other courts have reached the same conclusion. 86
3. Division on whether Bristol-Myers applies to class actions
Third, several federal courts have exercised pendent party
personal jurisdiction in class actions. In Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr.
Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., California plaintiffs brought a
nationwide class action against Dr. Pepper in a California
federal court. 87 After Bristol-Myers, Dr. Pepper argued the court
lacked specific personal jurisdiction over it as to the claims of

its decision to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction); Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple
Grp., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (citing considerations
unique to diversity jurisdiction in support of argument that Bristol-Myers applies to federal
courts “in cases that are before them solely on the basis of diversity”).
83. See No. 3:17-cv-30116-KAR, 2018 WL 2324092 (D. Mass. May 22, 2018).
84. See id. at *3 (quotations omitted) (quoting Pike v. Clinton Fishpacking, Inc., 143 F. Supp.
2d 162, 166 (D. Mass. 2001)). I discuss the relationship between service of process and personal
jurisdiction below. See infra notes 144–84 and accompanying text. Although service of process
is not the same thing as personal jurisdiction, the former is a prerequisite to the latter.
85. See id. at *3–5.
86. See, e.g., Roy, 2018 WL 2324092, at *9 (rejecting out-of-state claims brought under FLSA);
Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-cv-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL 1942525, at *14–16 (D.N.J. Apr.
25, 2018) (dismissing out-of-state Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims).
87. See 2017 WL 4224723, at *1–2.
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the non-California class members. 88 The court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that Bristol-Myers did not apply to federal
courts—at least those sitting in diversity—but concluded
instead that it did not apply to class actions. 89 The court
reasoned that, unlike in mass actions, absent class members are
not full parties in interest, thus making Bristol-Myers
distinguishable; the court acknowledged that its decision
allowed plaintiffs to “manipulate[] the[ir] complaint so as to not
run afoul” of the Court’s decision. 90
Several other courts have likewise determined Bristol-Myers
does not apply to class actions. 91 It is noteworthy that several of
these courts concluded that Bristol-Myers applies to federal
courts, but not to class actions. 92 This divide appears most
starkly in Molock v. Whole Foods Market. There, the court
dismissed out-of-state claims by named plaintiffs in a putative
class action but maintained personal jurisdiction with respect to
the in-state named plaintiffs’ class claims, effectively exercising
pendent party personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to
out-of-state claims from across the country. 93
In class actions, other courts have refused to wield pendent
party personal jurisdiction since Bristol-Myers, creating a
substantial split. For example, in Cirque du Soleil, an Illinois
plaintiff brought a putative nationwide class action under the
88. See id. at *3. The parties agreed the court did not have general personal jurisdiction.
89. See id. at *4.
90. See id. at *5.
91. See Allen v. Conagra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279-WHO, 2018 WL 6460451, at *4–8
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00085, 2018 WL 3580775, at *6
(W.D. Va. July 25, 2018); Garcia v. Peterson, 319 F. Supp. 3d 863, 880 (S.D. Tex. 2018); Becker v.
HBN Media, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Tickling Keys, Inc. v. Transamerica
Fin. Advisors, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1350–51 (M.D. Fla. 2018); Weisheit v. Rosenberg &
Assocs., LLC., No. JKB-17-0823, 2018 WL 1942196, at *15 (D. Md. Apr. 25, 2018); Casso’s
Wellness Store & Gym, L.L.C. v. Spectrum Lab. Prods., No. 17-2161, 2018 WL 1377608, at *5
(E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2018); Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2018);
Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2018); In
re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *12 (E.D.
La. Nov. 30, 2017); see also Swamy v. Title Source, Inc., No. 17-0117, 2017 WL 5196780, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 10, 2017) (concluding Bristol-Myers does not apply to FLSA collective actions).
92. See, e.g., Molock, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 126–27; Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5; see
also Allen, 2018 WL 6460451, at *5–6 (acknowledging the division and reserving the question).
93. See Molock, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 126.
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Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) in an Illinois
federal court. 94 Although the court granted class certification, it
limited the class to Illinois citizens, concluding Bristol-Myers
barred it from exercising personal jurisdiction as to the out-ofstate class members’ claims. 95 With no nationwide service of
process provision in the TCPA, the court explained that it had
to assert personal jurisdiction under state law. 96 This meant the
Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment cases (including
Bristol-Myers) limited the court, even though it exercised federal
question jurisdiction. 97 Because the out-of-state class members’
claims had no connection to Illinois, the court dismissed them. 98
Several other district courts have reached the same conclusion. 99
In summary, there is a substantial split on the validity and
scope of pendent party personal jurisdiction among the federal
courts after Bristol-Myers. As this Article heads to the printer, no
court of appeals has directly considered the doctrine’s validity,
though the Seventh Circuit recently highlighted the question of
whether Bristol-Myers applies to class actions in an interlocutory

94. See Practice Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d 840, 844–
46 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
95. See id. at 860–62.
96. See id. at 862.
97. See id. at 861–62. Contra Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 859 (N.D. Cal.
2018).
98. See Cirque du Soleil, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 864.
99. See, e.g., Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C 1948, 2018 WL 2238191, at *9–11 (N.D.
Ill. May 16, 2018); DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
18, 2018); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“Nothing
in Bristol–Myers suggests that it does not apply to named plaintiffs in a putative class action;
rather, the Court announced a general principal—that due process requires a ‘connection
between the forum and the specific claims at issue.’ That principle applies with equal force
whether or not the plaintiff is a putative class representative.”); McDonnell v. Nature’s Way
Prods., LLC, No. 16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Wenokur v. AXA
Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. CV-17-00165-PHX-DLR, 2017 WL 4357916, at *4 n.4 (D. Az. Oct. 2,
2017) (“The Court also notes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the claims of putative class
members with no connection to Arizona and therefore would not be able to certify a nationwide
class.”); In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litig., No. 16–696, 2017 WL 4217115, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
20, 2017) (“The constitutional requirements of due process do[] not wax and wane when the
complaint is individual or on behalf of a class. Personal jurisdiction in class actions must
comport with due process just the same as any other case.”); see also Demedicics v. CVS Health
Corp., No. 16-cv-5973, 2017 WL 569157, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2017) (refusing to exercise
specific personal jurisdiction as to out-of-state class members’ claims before Bristol-Myers).
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appeal and declined to address it, since the parties had not
argued the issue before the district court. 100
D. Observations on the Rise of Pendent Personal Jurisdiction
A few observations about the doctrine’s evolution are in
order. First, early courts usually embraced pendent claim
personal jurisdiction based on an analogy to the Supreme
Court’s articulation of pendent subject matter jurisdiction in
Gibbs. However, these early decisions often failed to give
coherent reasoning or acknowledge the significant differences
between personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 101
Second, later courts that accepted pendent claim personal
jurisdiction, including the appellate courts, often relied
uncritically on earlier precedents from other courts. For
example, the D.C. Circuit adopted pendent personal
jurisdiction in one paragraph featuring a citation to Gibbs, 102 a
footnote collecting precedents, an unsupported statement that
cases upholding the doctrine were “better reasoned” than those
rejecting it, and a cursory assertion that pendent personal
jurisdiction facilitated enforcement of the federal statute. 103 As
another example, the Second Circuit adopted the doctrine two
years later in a footnote that collected cases and summarily
concluded that the pro-jurisdiction cases were “better
reasoned” than the contrary ones. 104
Third, pendent party personal jurisdiction is provoking
significantly more controversy and division among the lower
courts than its pendent claim cousin. The biggest divide is on
whether Bristol-Myers limits multistate class actions.

100. See Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018, 1024–25 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is not
for us to take the first bite of this apple.”).
101. For a convincing critique of the reasoning in the earliest pendent personal jurisdiction
cases, see Ferguson, supra note 4, at 72 (“In summary, few of the decisions have really analyzed
the issue and the arguments on both sides and come to a reasoned conclusion.”).
102. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
103. Id. at 5.
104. Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979).
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Fourth, courts generally have not articulated a source of
authority for both types of pendent personal jurisdiction,
usually relying solely on precedent and free-floating public
policy considerations. Before returning to the doctrine’s legality
below, 105 the following Part takes up the project that courts have
overlooked: finding a source of authority for pendent personal
jurisdiction.
II. THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY FOR PENDENT PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
As the previous Part documents, pendent personal
jurisdiction has a dubious origin. Federal courts embraced it
without paying careful attention to their authority to do so. In
brief, early courts analogized pendent claim personal
jurisdiction to pendent subject matter jurisdiction; later courts
then uncritically relied on earlier precedents to fuel its
expansion; and more recently, courts are expanding pendent
claim personal jurisdiction to allow pendent party personal
jurisdiction, usually to enable multistate class actions.
This Article questions the federal courts’ authority to adopt
pendent personal jurisdiction. Although the Supreme Court’s
recent personal jurisdiction cases focused primarily on
constitutional limits, personal jurisdiction is first and foremost
statutory law. As with subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts
cannot exercise personal jurisdiction without statutory or rulebased authority. 106 More specifically, federal courts have long
understood service of process to be a prerequisite to personal
jurisdiction, and that statutory authorization is required for a
court to issue process. 107
105. See infra Part IV.
106. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 (1987) (citing the
“unmalleable principle of law that federal courts must ground their personal jurisdiction on a
federal statute or rule” (quoting Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415,
423 (5th Cir. 1986))); ESAB Grp. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 622 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Federal
district courts may exercise in personam jurisdiction only to the degree authorized by Congress
acting under its constitutional power to ‘ordain and establish’ the lower federal courts.”).
107. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1556 (2017) (“[A]bsent consent, a basis for
service of a summons on the defendant is prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”);
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There are two primary ways that federal courts can exercise
personal jurisdiction through service of process. First, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) specifies the default rule: a
federal court can maintain personal jurisdiction following
service of process when authorized by the jurisdictional statute
of the state where it sits. 108 Second, as recognized by Rule
4(k)(1)(C), Congress has the power to expand personal
jurisdiction from this default in particular federal statutes. 109
This Part addresses the possible sources of authority for
pendent personal jurisdiction. First, Section II.A considers
whether the federal courts can rely on federal law to wield it,
ultimately concluding they may not. Second, Section II.B
explains that, at least in some states, the federal courts can rely
on state long-arm statutes to maintain pendent personal
jurisdiction, subject only to constitutional limits. Section II.C
clarifies that, under current law, the assertion of both pendent
claim and pendent party personal jurisdiction depends on the
same source of authority: the state long-arm statutes.
A. Federal Statutory or Rule-Based Authority
Some courts have concluded that they had affirmative
authority to apply pendent claim personal jurisdiction because
of a federal statute or rule. No scholars or courts have yet
claimed that a federal statute or rule authorizes pendent party
personal jurisdiction, so this section focuses on pendent claim
personal jurisdiction.

Omni, 484 U.S. at 111 (“In summary, the District Court may not exercise jurisdiction . . . without
authorization to serve process.”); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444–46 (1946)
(describing how service of process is the mechanism by which a federal court maintains
statutorily-authorized personal jurisdiction); LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLAN R. STEIN & TOBIAS
BARRINGTON WOLFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE THEORY AND PRACTICE 180–81 (4th ed. 2013).
108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
109. See id. 4(k)(1)(C). There is a third way, though it arises in a relatively limited number of
cases. If a party is joined under Rule 19 as a required party or Rule 14, process can be served on
a party not more than one hundred miles away from the relevant district court. See id. 4(k)(1)(B).

242

DREXEL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:215

Congress has the power to authorize nationwide service of
process. 110 Indeed, it has done so for certain claims under
particular federal statutes. However, the Supreme Court has a
longstanding rule that it will construe congressional extensions
of service of process narrowly. 111 In Omni, the Court reaffirmed
this principle: because Congress knows it has the power to
establish nationwide service of process, the Court stated it will
not presume Congress intended to permit nationwide service of
process unless it does so explicitly. 112
Scholars and courts have proposed three bases for concluding
that federal law enables pendent claim personal jurisdiction: the
subject matter jurisdiction statutes, Rule 4, and the nationwide
service of process provisions in particular federal statutes. This
section ultimately argues that no federal statute or rule blesses
pendent claim personal jurisdiction, leaving state statutes as the
only potential source of authority for it. Additionally, this
section challenges the distinction, made by some courts and
scholars, between the legitimacy of pendent claim personal
jurisdiction in cases involving a nationwide service of process
provision and in cases without one. 113 For this to be true, one
110. See Omni, 484 U.S. at 103–04; Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925)
(“Congress has power, likewise, to provide that the process of every [d]istrict [c]ourt shall run
into every part of the United States.”).
111. See Robertson, 268 U.S. at 627 (“It is not lightly to be assumed that Congress intended to
depart from a long established policy” of personal jurisdiction rules).
112. See 484 U.S. at 106 (“It would appear that Congress knows how to authorize nationwide
service of process when it wants to provide for it. That Congress failed to do so here argues
forcefully that such authorization was not its intention.”). Omni and Robertson seem to articulate
a clear statement rule for service of process statutes, or at least command cautious, narrow
interpretations. To date, no scholar considering pendent personal jurisdiction has seen
Robertson’s or Omni’s rule of narrow construction as relevant. Without citing either case, Heller
asserts the opposite principle. See Heller, supra note 4, at 131 (“Such an inquiry is especially
proper here because statutes that extend the jurisdiction of the courts, as nationwide service of
process statutes do, are to be broadly construed.”).
113. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14; Cochran, supra note 4, at 1489–92 (arguing for different
analyses for nationwide service of process cases and cases where a state long-arm statute is used
to gain pendent personal jurisdiction); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 4, at 244–46 (describing
nationwide service of process cases as being on the least controversial end of a “spectrum,” with
other cases being more controversial on the spectrum); Simard, supra note 4, at 1627–31. But see
Yonan, supra note 4, at 571–72 (arguing for narrow interpretations of four nationwide service of
process provisions because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Finley, where the Court declined
to read the subject matter jurisdiction statute broadly).
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must interpret the nationwide service of process provisions to
permit pendent claim personal jurisdiction. Section II.A.3
argues that interpretation is not plausible.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1367
In Hargrave, the Second Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1332, the primary statutes for federal subject matter jurisdiction,
gave it the authority to assert pendent claim personal
jurisdiction. 114 First, the Second Circuit concluded that New
York’s long-arm statute only enabled personal jurisdiction as to
the plaintiff’s fraud claim, not his related contract claims. 115 As
the court framed it, “The question is whether Congress has
authorized the district court” to adjudicate the contract
claims. 116 The court then acknowledged that Rule 4(e)—now
4(k)(1)(A)—did not allow jurisdiction either. 117 In a remarkable
move, the court then turned to the federal statutes establishing
subject matter jurisdiction, sections 1331 and 1332. 118 The court
noted that, in both statutes, Congress authorized jurisdiction
over “actions,” either between citizens of different states or
those arising under federal laws or the Constitution. 119 The
court, citing Gibbs, noted that the term “action” has been
understood in some contexts to mean “the entire
controversy.” 120 Therefore, the court interpreted sections 1331
and 1332 to permit a district court to exercise pendent personal
jurisdiction to adjudicate the entire “action.” 121 Similarly, at
least one court has argued that the supplemental jurisdiction
statute—28 U.S.C. § 1367—enables pendent claim personal
jurisdiction. 122
114. See 646 F.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1980).
115. See id. at 718–19.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 719.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 796,
804 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
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There are two fundamental problems with this approach.
First, the language of sections 1331, 1332, and 1367 refers to only
one type of jurisdiction, long understood to be subject matter
jurisdiction. 123 These sections make no reference to personal
jurisdiction or “service of process,” which Congress has
codified as a separate prerequisite to federal jurisdiction since
the Judiciary Act of 1789. 124 Second, this approach would render
pointless all the separate federal statutory provisions defining
the scope of service of process. In short, rooting authority for
pendent personal jurisdiction in sections 1331, 1332, or 1367
would overturn the longtime understanding that Congress
authorizes subject matter and personal jurisdiction separately.
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)
Professor Linda Simard has proposed a different, but
ultimately unpersuasive, source of authority: Rule 4. As she
points out, the language of Rule (4)(k)(1) says that service of
process under the section “establish[es personal] jurisdiction
over the person of a defendant,” not that it establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant as to a particular claim. 125 She
suggests that the rulemakers’ decision not to use the word
“claim” is especially notable since they used the term in Rule
(4)(k)(2). 126 She concludes that Rule 4 is ambiguous, and then
says policy arguments should push us to favor the broader
interpretation. 127
123. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at § 1069.7 (“Neither the plain meaning of this
statute, which shows it to be a subject matter jurisdiction provision, nor its legislative
history supports the conclusion that Congress intended [s]ection 1367 to
include personal jurisdiction.”); cf. BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1553 (2017) (concluding
that similar language in FELA refers only to subject matter jurisdiction, and not to personal
jurisdiction). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 778–84, 1413–14 (7th ed. 2015).
124. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1987) (reasoning
that congressional authorization of subject matter jurisdiction alone is not sufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction over a defendant). For more on the Judiciary Act, see infra note 151.
125. Simard, supra note 4, at 1645–46.
126. Id. at 1646.
127. See id. at 1646–48. She attempts to ground her policy argument in the rules. First, Simard
observes that Rule 1 commands that rules “shall be construed and administered to secure the
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But even if Rule 4 is ambiguous, that ambiguity does not give
free rein to set a meaning consistent with public policy goals—
Robertson and Omni command that service of process provisions
be narrowly construed. 128 Further, her interpretation has
serious problems. Except for Rule 4(k)(1)(B), Rule 4(k)(1) does
not deal in specifics; it delegates determination of when service
is appropriate to state or federal statutes, suggesting we should
look to them to determine the scope of a federal court’s process.
Moreover, Simard’s interpretation would allow plaintiffs to
bring claims unrelated to the anchor claim, thus obliterating the
line between specific and general personal jurisdiction. 129
Because the Court has cautioned against blurring that line, 130
her interpretation is untenable. Rule 4(k)(1) does not authorize
pendent personal jurisdiction. 131

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Id. at 1647 (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 1). She also points to notes from the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of Practice and
Procedure. See id. at 1648. The notes that Simard points to, however, refer specifically to subject
matter jurisdiction, as is made clear by the Committee’s citation to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
128. See Omni, 484 U.S. at 105–06 (“It would appear that Congress knows how to authorize
nationwide service of process when it wants to provide for it. That Congress failed to do so here
argues forcefully that such authorization was not its intention.”); Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd.,
268 U.S. 619, 624–27 (1925); supra note 112. Logically, the rule of strict construction should also
apply to rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001) (urging that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be
narrowly construed to “minimize potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act” (quoting Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842 (1999))); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
444–46 (1946) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be interpreted to
expand the jurisdiction of federal courts). Indeed, historical evidence suggests that members of
the original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules were concerned about the rules usurping
Congress’s power to define the scope of service of process. See Stephen Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1172 n.673 (1982) (discussing the anxieties of
various constituencies).
129. Professor Simard acknowledges this problem. See Simard, supra note 4, at 1646.
130. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017)
(emphasizing that specific and general jurisdiction are “very different”).
131. Although I have seen no published work suggest this, one of the individuals who
helpfully commented on drafts of this Article asked whether Rule 18 could be understood to
authorize pendent claim personal jurisdiction. Rule 18 allows plaintiffs to join multiple claims
against a defendant. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules made clear that this rule, like the
rules dealing with the joinder of parties, governs only pleading requirements, and does not
address jurisdictional requirements. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18 advisory committee’s note to 1966
amendment (stating that Rule 18 “does not purport to deal with questions of jurisdiction or
venue which may arise with respect to claims properly joined as a matter of pleading”).
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3. Specific federal statutes
Finally, some scholars and courts have proposed that specific
federal laws enable pendent claim personal jurisdiction. 132 If a
federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process
allowed pendent claim personal jurisdiction, a federal court
could exercise it without needing to rely on the long-arm statute
of the state where it sits. 133 Congress has only established
nationwide service of process for federal claims in a limited
number of statutes. 134 Ultimately, this Article concludes that
these various federal statutes (with one potential, limited
exception) do not bless pendent claim personal jurisdiction as
to claims that are related to the relevant federal claims referred
to in the statutes.
a. A representative example: the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
Section 27 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act provides a
representative example of the language contained in these
provisions, so we start our analysis there. The provision states:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or rules and regulations
thereunder . . . may be brought in any such
district or in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business,
and process in such cases may be served in any
other district of which the defendant is an

132. See Cochran, supra note 4, at 1477; Heller, supra note 4, at 137; Mills, supra note 4, at 439–
40. This subsection does not focus on pendent party personal jurisdiction because a nationwide
service of process provision makes it unnecessary to invoke that doctrine. Subject to any
pertinent constitutional limitations under the Fifth Amendment, see infra note 176, personal
jurisdiction rules do not bar anyone from bringing a direct purchaser claim under the Clayton
Act anywhere in the United States because of the nationwide service of process provision. Thus,
plaintiffs from around the country can, assuming any other requirements are met, join together
their Clayton Act claims in any federal court.
133. See Yonan, supra note 4, at 560 (stating that a statutory provision would allow a federal
court to “circumvent” the long-arm statute limitation).
134. See infra note 184.
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inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
found. 135
Many applications of pendent claim personal jurisdiction have
occurred under this provision. 136 Analyzing this provision in
Hargrave, the Second Circuit started by pointing to prior cases—
International Controls Corp. and Robinson—and then it justified
how the courts in those cases embraced pendent claim personal
jurisdiction under section 27. 137 The court, as it did when
analyzing sections 1331 and 1332, focused on the word
“action.” 138 Pointing to cases like Gibbs, where “action” was
interpreted broadly to mean “the entire controversy,” the court
decided that section 27 authorized pendent claim personal
jurisdiction as to state-law claims related to the federal
securities claim. 139
However, this conclusion is unsatisfactory. Take a closer look
at the relevant sentence, which allows nationwide service of
process for “[a]ny suit or action to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder.” 140 The
court focused on the word “action,” and then interpreted it
broadly. But the sentence qualifies what type of “action”
nationwide service of process is permitted for: the “action” is
one to enforce a duty or liability “created by this chapter.” 141
Although it is possible to read “action” in its broadest Gibbsesque sense here, the more plausible reading is that nationwide
service of process is conferred only for claims brought to
enforce the provisions of the Act. 142 Thus, section 27 does not
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2018).
136. See, e.g., Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979); Robinson v.
Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973).
137. See 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980). In those cases, the courts did not attempt to
articulate a statutory basis for their actions.
138. See id. at 719–20.
139. See id.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. But see Cochran, supra note 4, at 1476 (making a similar Gibbs-centered argument for the
Investment Company Act of 1940); Mills, supra note 4, at 439–40 (arguing that the statute should
be read similarly to how the Gibbs Court interpreted “case” in Article III of the Constitution).
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permit service of process for claims other than those created by
the Act. Therefore, a court cannot exercise pendent claim
personal jurisdiction through section 27.
b. Interpreting service of process provisions
This subsection takes a closer interpretive look at section 27,
confronting the challenge of interpreting service of process
provisions. Scholars have devoted little attention to this
challenge.
Interpreting section 27 is complicated because of the
confusing relationship between personal jurisdiction and
service of process. Literally speaking, service of process is
merely the means by which the court gives notice to a defendant
that she is being sued. 143 Traditionally, service of process has
also served the function of asserting the court’s personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, which explains why Congress
has authorized “service of process” when it wanted to allow
federal courts to assert personal jurisdiction. 144 Thus, statutes or
rules regulating service of process serve two roles. 145 First, they
regulate the procedure, the means by which notice is given to a
defendant. 146 Second, they define the scope of process and, by
extension, a court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction. 147
Still, service of process is not the same thing as personal
jurisdiction, posing this question: does section 27’s delineated
scope of service of process limit a federal court’s scope of
personal jurisdiction under section 27? If so, then federal courts
143. See HERMA KAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 414 (9th ed. 2013) (explaining that notice is
“so often confused with personal jurisdiction because both are commonly dealt with under the
single rubric of due process”); Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a ‘Substantive
Right”: The Invalidity of Rule 4(k) Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 IND. L.J. 1191, 1203–04 (2000)
(distinguishing between the “manner and method of service of process” and “amenability to
jurisdiction”).
144. See BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1556 (2017) (“Congress uses this terminology
because, absent consent, a basis for service of a summons on the defendant is prerequisite to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.”).
145. See SILBERMAN, STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 255.
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)–(j), (l)–(n) (describing the contents, issuance, specifics of service,
time limits, and jurisdiction over property and assets for a summons).
147. See id. 4(k); see also SILBERMAN, STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 255.
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cannot exercise pendent claim personal jurisdiction. This
Article considers two interpretive approaches: textualism and
purposivism.
Textualists should conclude that “service of process” implies
personal jurisdiction, so that statutory boundaries on service of
process limit, by extension, personal jurisdiction. The rule of
ordinary meaning, a textualist’s starting point, 148 does little to
elucidate the meaning of “service of process.” 149 A more
promising option is to treat “service of process” as a legal term
of art that implies “personal jurisdiction.” 150 Moreover, the
textualist would investigate how the phrase “service of
process” was historically used in an effort to describe an
objective legislative intent. 151
The historical inquiry should lead a textualist to determine
that section 27’s use of the phrase “service of process” was
understood to delineate the bounds of personal jurisdiction, not
just the means by which a party is informed of a lawsuit.
Historically, when Congress has wished to authorize personal
jurisdiction, it has used the term “service of process.” Starting
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress established service of
process scope rules as separate constraints on assertions of
jurisdiction by the lower federal courts. 152 Throughout
148. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking the
Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV. 121, 136–37 (2016) (discussing
the “signs” to be used when determining the meaning of words with the ordinary meaning of
the word being the touchstone).
149. See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306–07 (1931) (applying the rule of ordinary
meaning).
150. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here Congress
borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.”); see also Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947) (“[I]f a word is obviously
transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings
soil with it.”).
151. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
152. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (“And no civil suit shall be brought
before [the lower federal courts] against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original
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American history, courts referred to personal jurisdiction in
terms of “service of process.” 153 For example, in 1814, the
Connecticut Supreme Court stated, “there must be not only a
jurisdiction of the subject matter, but also a jurisdiction of
the process.” 154 Thus, it is unsurprising that, starting with the
Clayton Act, all of the relevant nationwide service of process
provisions featured the “service of process” language. 155 Just
nine years before Congress enacted section 27, the Supreme
Court stated that personal jurisdiction “implies . . . service of
process upon” the individual. 156
The foregoing allows textualists to identify an objective
legislative intent in the “service of process” phraseology,
concluding section 27 defines the scope of personal jurisdiction,
not just the means by which a defendant is given notice.
Moreover, today’s legal community still treats the terms
process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant.”); see also Ex Parte Graham,
10 F. Cas. 911, 912 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (Washington, Circuit Justice) (stating that Congress “has
not left this subject to implication” and that the Judiciary Act’s provisions on service of process
“appear manifestly to circumscribe the jurisdiction” of the federal courts); G.W. Foster, Jr.,
Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts,
47 F.R.D. 73, 79–80 (1968) (identifying the Judiciary Act’s regulation of personal jurisdiction
through service of process terminology). Until 1938, absent a nationwide service of process
provision in a federal statute, the Judiciary Act limited the scope of a federal district court’s
process to the geographical territory of the judicial district that it sat in. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(f), adopted by the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act in 1938, expanded
the scope of the district courts’ process to reach throughout the particular states they sat in. See
Kelleher, supra note 143, at 1204–05 (explaining the historical development).
153. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 608–09 (1990); Mech. Appliance
Co. v. Castleman, 215 U.S. 437, 441–42, 446 (1910) (dismissing complaint for “want of
jurisdiction” when process was served beyond the authorized scope (emphasis added));
Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. 336, 338–40 (1850) (“If the process be not sufficient to bring the
defendant into court and make him a party to the decree, where all the other proceedings are
regular, the case cannot be improved.”); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F.Cas. 609, 616 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828)
(Story, Circuit Justice); Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige Ch. 425, 430 (N.Y. Ch. 1834); Evans v. Instine, 7
Ohio 273, 275 (1835); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447, 449 (Pa. 1844).
154. Gruman v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 44 (1814).
155. See infra note 184. In a recent proposed bill, Congress considered replacing the
traditional “service of process” language with text instead defining the scope of “personal
jurisdiction.” See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 1535, 113th Cong. § 5(e) (2004)
(authorizing “personal jurisdiction” while not mentioning “service of process”). However,
Congress deleted that language from the final version of the bill, substituting “service of
process” in its place. Even if Congress is shifting away from its old “service of process”
language, that does not change the original meaning of past provisions.
156. See Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1925).
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“service
of
process”
and
“personal
jurisdiction”
157
interchangeably.
The Court’s controlling precedents
recognize the distinction between the two concepts, yet strongly
imply that the power to exercise personal jurisdiction
necessarily depends on the authorization to issue process.158
Thus, a conventionalist interpreter would reach the same result
as a textualist focusing on original, objective legislative intent. 159
Having determined that the legal community historically
used—and currently uses—”service of process” to imply
“personal jurisdiction,” section 27 is not otherwise ambiguous:
it allows nationwide service of process for “[a]ny suit or action
to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder.” 160 Thus, textualists and conventionalists
would conclude the provision only authorizes nationwide
personal jurisdiction for federal courts as to claims created by
the 1934 Exchange Act or SEC regulations promulgated
thereunder, and not for related claims created by other sources.

157. See, e.g., Ohio Civ. R. 4.1 (“Service of process may be made outside of this state, as
provided in this rule, in any action in this state, upon a person who, at the time of service of
process, is a nonresident of this state or is a resident of this state who is absent from this state.”);
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553 n.5 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[A]s a general rule,
service of process is the means by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant
. . . .”); KAY ET AL., supra note 143, at 414 (explaining that notice is “so often confused with
personal jurisdiction because both are commonly dealt with under the single rubric of due
process”); Rachel M. Janutis, Pulling Venue Up By Its Bootstraps: The Relationship Among
Nationwide Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and § 1391(C), 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 37, 37–38
(2004) (“Since a corporation subject to nationwide service of process is subject to nationwide
personal jurisdiction . . . .”); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(f) (“[S]erving a summons or filing a
waiver of service . . . is effective to establish personal jurisdiction . . . .”).
158. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1555 (2017) (“Congress’ typical mode of
providing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction has been to authorize service of process.”);
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (“[A] federal district court’s authority to assert
personal jurisdiction in most cases is linked to service of process on a defendant who is subject
to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court
is located.”); Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 102, 111 (1987) (“In
summary, the District Court may not exercise jurisdiction . . . without authorization to serve
process.”); United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 381 (1965) (assuming the federal
district court in New York had personal jurisdiction over an international defendant where
New York’s long-arm statute authorized international service of process on all those who
conducted business within the state).
159. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 510–15 (1996)
(defining the conventionalist approach to statutory interpretation).
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
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Indeed, it does not make intuitive sense that Congress intended
to permit personal jurisdiction beyond the scope of process it
authorized for the district courts. 161 Although there are policy
arguments against this conclusion, a textualist approach deems
such considerations irrelevant because federal courts have
limited power and must be faithful to statutes passed by an
elected legislature. 162 Although judges might prefer a different
public policy outcome, a textualist approach accepts that
democratically accountable branches of government must
make these choices. 163
Section 27’s meaning is a closer call for purposivist
interpreters. Because service of process does not literally mean
the same thing as personal jurisdiction, one could think that
Congress did not reveal how much personal jurisdiction it
wished to authorize in the statute. This conclusion would allow
courts to determine how much personal jurisdiction is
consistent with Congress’s purpose, and then to promulgate a
federal common-law standard consistent with that purpose. 164
161. To clarify, this Article does not suggest the scope of authorized process and validlyasserted personal jurisdiction are coextensive. Sometimes, service of process is allowed by
statute but personal jurisdiction cannot be asserted for constitutional reasons. See SILBERMAN,
STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 271–72. This Article does suggest that, in statutes using the
“service of process” phraseology, the scope of service is the maximum scope of valid personal
jurisdiction, a category which might be narrower than statutorily-authorized service for
constitutional reasons.
162. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 151, at 12–14 (arguing that courts play a limited role in
making public policy within a representative system of government); see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 47 (James Madison) (“Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the
legislator.”) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Hafner Pub. Co. N.Y. 1949)). Conventionalists would approach the issue similarly. See Merrill,
supra note 159, at 513 (“Thus, like originalism, conventionalism posits that the role of the
interpreter is to find the meaning of the contested textual provision . . . . not to make it up.”).
163. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive
Process, an Institutionalist Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 762–64 (1989) (“[A] fundamentally
democratic society assumes as its ultimate normative political premise some notion of selfdetermination . . . . Thus a representational democratic system will measure the legitimacy of
governmental decisionmaking . . . not by objective examination of the wisdom of the decision,
but rather by determining how consistent the processes used to reach that decision are with the
notion of self-determination.”).
164. This approach was suggested to me by Professor Stephen Burbank. See also HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (encouraging
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Under this approach, the federal courts could infer authority to
exercise personal jurisdiction as to claims for which section 27
does not authorize service of process.
Seeking a meaning consistent with the congressional
purposes behind section 27 will likely produce two alternative,
constructive answers. The provision’s narrower purpose is to
ensure that federal courts are not inhibited from adjudicating
claims under the Act because of traditional jurisdictional
barriers. 165 This purpose does not support pendent claim
personal jurisdiction as to the related claims, because claims
under the Act can be brought without it. An alternative, broader
constructive purpose behind section 27 is to encourage
plaintiffs to bring claims under the Act in federal court. Further,
one can argue that allowing pendent claim personal jurisdiction
advances this purpose because, without it, forcing a plaintiff to
occasionally bring her state-law claims separately would
discourage that plaintiff from bringing her claim under the Act
in federal court. Additionally, section 27 grants federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to claims arising under the
Act. This means that if section 27 does not permit pendent
judges to use tools of construction to determine “what purpose ought to be attributed to the
statute” to “carry out [Congress’s] purpose as best it can”). Although this section discusses
“interpretation,” the line between statutory interpretation, construction, and the promulgation
of federal common law can become blurry. Outside certain substantive areas of uniquely federal
concern, like the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements under the Lincoln Mills
doctrine, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), even strong defenders
of federal common law acknowledge it must be tethered to a source of written law. See, e.g.,
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion and Federal Common Law: A General Approach,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 625, 759 (1985) (stating that the Rules of Decisions Act requires a federal
judge to justify federal common law with reference to a constitutional or statutory source that
either “expressly” requires its creation or “implicitly and plausibly call[s] for” it); Martha A.
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 927–30 (1986)
(“[T]he primary limit on power to make federal common law is that there must be a source of
authority for any given federal common law rule.”). In federal common-law terms, this
subsection argues that the constructive purposes behind section 27 should not lead one to favor
promulgating a federal common law of pendent personal jurisdiction.
165. See Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (1984) (“Although the legislative history of the
securities laws is silent as to the government interests furthered by nationwide personal
jurisdiction, one can easily assume that Congress believed that allowing investors to litigate
securities fraud issues anywhere in the nation was a beneficial approach to policing the stock
market . . . .”). I found no relevant legislative history when searching through the Act’s
congressional record.
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personal jurisdiction, there will be some cases where the
plaintiff must bring her federal and state-law claims separately.
Even without embracing a broad interpretation, however,
plaintiffs will usually be able to bring all claims together in a
federal court within the state where the court can adjudicate the
state-law claims under the state’s long-arm statute, mitigating
the problem of exclusive jurisdiction.
Precedent suggests that the purposivist judge should
embrace the narrower purpose and thus not discover pendent
personal jurisdiction within section 27. Deliberating in light of
Congress’s record of defining limits on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts through service of process, 166 the Supreme Court
has instructed federal courts not to expand the scope of their
service of process by promulgating common law. 167 In Omni, the
Court considered the question of whether federal courts could
exercise a federal common-law power to allow nationwide
service of process under the Commodity Exchange Act, which
did not have a nationwide service of process provision. 168 The
Court held that it was not appropriate to imply such a
provision. 169 The Court noted that Congress knows how to
authorize nationwide service of process, stating that its failure
to do so speaks forcefully against the idea that it intended to do
so. 170 The Court’s language resembles a clear statement rule. At
the very least, it suggests that nationwide service of process
statutes should be interpreted narrowly. 171

166. For another example, at a 1924 congressional hearing, Justice Willis Van Devanter
testified that the Court had “always dealt with” out-of-state service of process “as a question to
be regulated by Congress or by statutes.” See Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 2060 and
S. 2061 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Judiciary Comm., 68th Cong. 62 (1924).
167. But see Heller, supra note 4, at 131–37 (“[I]t is appropriate to read nationwide service of
process statutes as authorizing pendent process, because pendent process furthers the purposes
for which these statutes were enacted.”).
168. See 484 U.S. 102, 108–09 (1987).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 106.
171. See SILBERMAN, STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 180 (interpreting Omni to hold that
“federal courts must have explicit authorization in a statute or federal rule in order to effect
service beyond state lines”); supra note 112.
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But unlike the statute in Omni, section 27 does have a
nationwide service of process provision. But the same
rationales justifying application of Omni’s interpretive rules to
whether a nationwide service of process statute exists should
also apply to measuring an existing provision’s scope. Congress
could have chosen language making it clear that process was
also authorized for related claims. 172 Congress has authorized
nationwide service of process for state-law claims in other
situations. 173 But it did not do so in section 27. Under Omni’s
logic, the fact that Congress did not use broader language in
section 27 counsels against a broad interpretation. 174
Further, public policy considerations point in both directions
and do not provide a compelling reason to depart from the
Court’s precedent and the statute’s natural reading. Although

172. Congress arguably did that with the Federal Arbitration Act, which authorizes
nationwide service of process by a federal court to enforce an arbitration award. When the
statute is triggered, “the court shall have jurisdiction of [the served] party as though he had
appeared generally in the proceeding.” 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2018). If one is persuaded this provision
allows pendent personal jurisdiction, then it is an exception to the analysis that follows.
173. It has done so twice. See SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 107, at 181. First, 28 U.S.C. § 2361
authorizes nationwide service for claims brought under the federal interpleader statute. See 28
U.S.C. § 2361 (2018). Second, the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act permits
nationwide service of process in cases involving mass accidents that kill at least seventy-five
people. See 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2018).
174. See, e.g., Knight v. Comm’r., 552 U.S. 181, 188 (2008) (citing Congress’s decision not to
adopt “apparent alternative” language to support a statutory reading). The most significant
precedent pointing the other way is Gibbs. In Gibbs, the Court cited public policy reasons to
recognize pendent claim subject matter jurisdiction, and it neglected to cite the governing
statutory provisions. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (citing
justifications of “judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants”). There is tension
between Gibbs and the Court’s tradition of paying careful attention to Congress’s statutory
authorization of jurisdiction. See FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 123, at 866–67. Indeed, scholars
recognized that the Court repudiated much of the rationale underlying Gibbs in Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367:
The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 157 (1999) (“Finley brought to a close
the free-wheeling jurisdictional days of Gibbs and inaugurated an era of close attention to
statutory text.”). This Article will not address whether Gibbs was correct, because it does not
undercut my argument. Whereas section 27’s language cannot be fairly read to authorize
pendent personal jurisdiction, one can justify Gibbs’s holding under the statutory language in
28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows subject matter jurisdiction over “civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Even if not the most natural reading, the
term “civil action” can be understood to be coextensive with Article III’s “case.” To the extent
there is tension between Gibbs and my argument, this Article privileges Robertson and Omni, the
governing cases.
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pendent claim personal jurisdiction helps plaintiffs, honoring
the principle that the plaintiff is the “master of his forum,” 175 it
threatens defendants’ interests. Although a purposivist may
dislike the occasional situation where a plaintiff must litigate
federal and state claims separately, a broad reading would
greatly expand plaintiffs’ forum shopping options. It would
allow a plaintiff to bring state-law claims in any federal court
across the country if she can articulate a related claim under a
federal law with a nationwide service of process provision.
Further, the Fifth Amendment—the constitutional check on
nationwide service of process—offers defendants little
protection against extreme forum shopping. 176 Similarly, venue
provisions will often not protect defendants in these cases. 177
Defendants aside, it is questionable whether reading section
27 to enable pendent personal jurisdiction would promote good
policy. Although it seems attractive to resolve a plaintiff’s
claims in one judicial proceeding, a broad reading does little to
facilitate efficiency, as plaintiffs ordinarily can have their claims
resolved in one judicial proceeding without pendent claim
personal jurisdiction, even in cases involving exclusive federal

175. See, e.g., Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on
Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 301 (1996) (quoting and referencing George D. Brown, The
Ideology of Forum Shopping—Why Doesn’t a Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV.
649, 669 (1993)).
176. Courts are currently split on whether the Fifth Amendment provides any limits on
assertions of personal jurisdiction within the United States. Compare Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S.
527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[D]ue process requires only certain minimum contacts
between the defendant and the sovereign that has created the court. The issue is not whether it
is unfair to require a defendant to assume the burden of litigating in an inconvenient
forum . . . . The cases before us involve suits against residents of the United States in the courts
of the United States. No due process problem exists.”), and Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330,
333 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that jurisdiction within the United States does not implicate a Fifth
Amendment fairness concern), with DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 286
n.3 (3d Cir. 1981) (suggesting that extreme inconvenience to a defendant may violate due
process even if it has significant contacts with the United States). Any limits are likely minimal
and would offer little protection. But see Fullerton, supra note 165, at 16–22 (arguing for more
robust limits on personal jurisdiction within the United States under the Fifth Amendment).
177. See Janutis, supra note 157, at 37 (observing that federal courts have interpreted
nationwide service of process provisions to allow for nationwide venue); Fullerton, supra note
165, at 62–63 (observing that venue protections often do not protect against unreasonable
applications of nationwide service of process provisions).

2018]

RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS

257

jurisdiction. 178 Moreover, federal courts are not best equipped
to resolve state-law issues unconnected with the state they sit
in. 179 Relatedly, the local community that the federal court sits
in would likely have little interest in expending resources to
adjudicate controversies utterly unconnected with it. 180 Further,
beyond the parties’ interests, a narrow reading promotes
comity with the state courts, who have an interest in
adjudicating cases connected to them. 181 Finally, allowing lower
federal courts—whose authority is defined by Congress—to
expand the scope of their process threatens the separation of
powers. 182 Because Congress has the authority to define the
federal courts’ personal jurisdiction, it would be an usurpation
of that authority for the federal courts to expand it sua sponte.183

178. Ordinarily, plaintiffs could bring their federal and state-law claims in a federal court
sitting within the state that the state-law claims are connected to or in a state where the
defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction.
179. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (noting that letting state courts decide state-law questions
“promote[s] justice between the parties [] by procuring for them a surer-footed reading” of state
law); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal
Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1774 (1992) (“[A]
court’s level of expertise in and familiarity with a sovereign’s body of law will be in direct
proportion to the amount of time it devotes to interpretation of that law.”).
180. Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (“Jury duty is a burden that
ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the
litigation.”).
181. See, e.g., Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (“Needless decisions of state law [by federal courts]
should be avoided as [] a matter of comity . . . .”).
182. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Courts created by statute can
have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
8, 9 n.1 (1799) (“The political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a few
specified instances) belongs to congress . . . . [and] Congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps,
be inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts to every subject, in every form,
which the Constitution might warrant.”); see also Nw. Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union, 451
U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (“[T]he federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial
branch, of government.”).
183. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 109 (1987) (“It seems
likely that Congress has been acting on the assumption that federal courts cannot add to the
scope of service of summons Congress has authorized.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20 (1985) (describing separation of
powers considerations “as the dominant ground for questioning lawmaking by federal courts”);
cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027, 1054 (2002) (identifying federal judges’ “perfectly natural desires to maximize their
own power and to serve their own institutional interests,” but arguing in the interjurisdictional
preclusion context that they should “not be given free rein to define and pursue that interest”).
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In short, section 27 should not be read to authorize pendent
personal jurisdiction. For textualists, it seems like an easy call.
For purposivists, the question is closer, but precedent and
public policy favor the more natural reading. This argument
calls into question the precedents that have relied on section
27’s service of process provisions to adjudicate state-law claims.
c. Other nationwide service of process provisions
The analysis of the preceding subsection reaches beyond the
1934 Securities Exchange Act. It should apply with equal force
to the Clayton Act, Investment Company Act, the RICO Act, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and several other
statutes with similar language. 184 Consistent with the preceding
184. The language authorizing nationwide service of process is similar in all relevant
statutes. I italicize the limiting language in each one. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2018) (“Any
suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only
in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found
or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.”); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a43 (2018) (“Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation
of, this subchapter or rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, may be brought in any such district or
in the district wherein the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such
cases may be served in any district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business
or wherever the defendant may be found.”); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1965d (2018) (“All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter
may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has
an agent, or transacts his affairs.”); Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2334
(2018) (“Any civil action under section 2333 of this title against any person may be instituted in
the district court of the United States for any district where any plaintiff resides or where any
defendant resides or is served, or has an agent. Process in such a civil action may be served in
any district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent.”); Mandamus and Venue
Statute of 1962, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2018) (“A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color
of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which: (1) a defendant in the
action resides; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,
or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) the plaintiff
resides if no real property is involved in the action . . . . The summons and complaint in such an
action [may] be served . . . by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which
the action is brought.”); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1451(d) (2018)
(“An action under this section may be brought in the district where the plan is administered or
where a defendant resides or does business, and process may be served in any district where a
defendant resides, does business, or may be found.”); Patent Codification Act, 35 U.S.C. § 293
(2018) (“Every patentee not residing in the United States may file in the Patent and Trademark
Office a written designation stating the name and address of a person residing within the
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discussion, the nationwide service of process provisions in
these statutes should not be read to allow pendent claim
personal jurisdiction.
In summary, the subject matter jurisdiction statutes, Rule 4,
and the cited federal nationwide service of process provisions
do not authorize pendent claim personal jurisdiction. However,
accepting my argument does not yet doom pendent claim
personal jurisdiction. If a federal court cannot rely on a federal
statute to authorize its personal jurisdiction, it can rely on the
long-arm statute of the state in which it sits.
B. State Long-Arm Statutes
The federal courts, at least in some states, could attempt to
rely on state long-arm statutes to exercise pendent claim and
party personal jurisdiction. The United States has a federalist
system of personal jurisdiction for the federal courts, often
forcing them to rely on state law to assert it, even as to federal
claims. 185 Historically speaking, this situation is best
understood as the inheritance of a long history and tradition of
personal jurisdiction based on the territorial boundaries of the
state courts. 186 Today, Rule 4(k)(1)(A) designates state long-arm
statutes as the primary source of authority for federal court

United States on whom may be served process or notice of proceedings affecting the patent or
rights thereunder.”).
185. See, e.g., Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 422–23 (5th Cir.
1986) (“It may seem anomalous to tie personal jurisdiction in a federal question case to the longarm statute of the state in which the federal court sits . . . . A heavy weight of authority, however,
accepts the anomaly.”).
186. See Omni, 484 U.S. at 109 (explaining how the history of territory-based personal
jurisdiction has influenced the modern doctrine); Foster, Jr., supra note 152, at 79–80 (“These
restrictions represented a policy choice that reflected the prevailing [eighteenth c]entury
procedural practices and, perhaps to some extent, the larger compromise which led to the
establishment of a system of federal trial courts exercising a jurisdiction largely concurrent with
that of the state courts.”). It is not my current project to analyze whether, as a matter of policy,
the status quo make sense. Other scholars have recently addressed this question. See, e.g.,
Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301 (2014)
(proposing legislation establishing nationwide personal jurisdiction for the federal courts and
suggesting we rely on venue rules to limit where lawsuits may be brought).
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assertions of personal jurisdiction. 187 Since there is no federal
law authorizing pendent claim or party personal jurisdiction,
we must ask if state law authorizes it for the federal courts.
No state long-arm statute explicitly authorizes either pendent
claim or party personal jurisdiction. However, states often
formulate these statutes to allow the maximum amount of
personal jurisdiction that is consistent with the Constitution
(“full-extent statutes”). 188 As of 2004, thirty-two states had
adopted full-extent statutes either by their terms or judicial
construction. 189 Because there is no other federal source of
authority for pendent claim or party personal jurisdiction,
federal courts in the states that have not adopted full-extent
statutes need to articulate a source of authority under state law
for pendent personal jurisdiction before doing so. This will
require federal courts in those states to look at the particular
long-arm statute and precedents of the state in which they sit. 190
For federal courts sitting in states that do have long-arm
statutes authorizing pendent personal jurisdiction, the next
question is whether exercising that jurisdiction is consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment. Although it may seem odd
that the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment,
limits federal court assertions of pendent personal jurisdiction,
the Fourteenth Amendment limits the state laws that federal
courts must rely on. Indeed, this analytical framework is well
187. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 272, 283 (2014) (“Federal courts
ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”
(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014))). Although Rule 4(k)(1)(A) is widely
understood to apply when a federal district court exercises diversity and federal question
jurisdiction (absent a nationwide service process provision), some think it should not. Professor
Kelleher argues that Rule 4(k)(1)(A) violates the Rules Enabling Act by governing the scope of
the district courts’ service of process, and not merely the manner of it. See Kelleher, supra note
143, at 1209–14. Professor Kelleher, moreover, asserts that the scope of a federal court’s service
of process in diversity cases is governed by statute, as she interprets the Rules of Decision Act
to require federal courts to rely on state long-arm statutes in diversity cases. See id. at 1211–12;
see also Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 711–12 (1982)
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (articulating the same view of the Rules of Decision Act).
188. See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the
Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 492–99 (2004) (documenting the trend).
189. For a list, see id. at 525–31.
190. Some state courts have already concluded that pendent claim personal jurisdiction is
invalid under state law. See supra note 5.
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established by the Supreme Court. 191 Consequently, although a
bit constitutionally quirky, the Fourteenth Amendment
currently limits federal court assertions of pendent claim and
party personal jurisdiction
C. Implications
State long-arm statutes are the only possible source of
authority for a federal court’s assertion of pendent claim or
party personal jurisdiction. Two important implications follow
from this conclusion. First, courts and scholars have sometimes
drawn a conceptual line between pendent claim personal
jurisdiction in the “nationwide service of process cases” and its
application in other cases. 192 Indeed, almost all circuits have
embraced it in nationwide service of process cases, whereas far
fewer courts have done so beyond that. 193 But there is no
meaningful distinction between these different contexts
because those statutes do not authorize pendent claim personal
jurisdiction. All current applications of pendent claim personal
jurisdiction depend on the same source of authority: the state
long-arm statutes. Although Congress could authorize pendent
claim personal jurisdiction in a federal statute, it has not done
so. It does not make sense to accept the legitimacy of pendent
claim personal jurisdiction in the nationwide service of process
context but reject it in other contexts.
Second, federal assertions of pendent personal jurisdiction
can only be legitimate in states that have authorized it.
Although no state long-arm statute explicitly authorizes

191. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 283–91 (analyzing Nevada federal court’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment); Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 125–29 (detailing the
analytical framework when a federal court asserts personal jurisdiction under state law); see also
Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017) (“As a procedural matter, federal courts
look to state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over a party. The Illinois longarm statute permits the court to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the state statutory and federal
constitutional requirements merge.”); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 54–55 (D.C. Cir.
2017); Borchers, supra note 2, at 443.
192. See supra note 14.
193. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
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pendent personal jurisdiction, some states have “full-extent
statutes,” meaning a federal court can exercise pendent
personal jurisdiction in those states as long as it is consistent with
the Constitution, a question I take up below. In the states
without full-extent long-arm statutes, the federal courts cannot
authorize pendent personal jurisdiction unless they cite a statelaw source of authority.
III. THE RELATEDNESS ELEMENT, BRISTOL-MYERS, AND
INTERSTATE FEDERALISM
This Article ultimately argues that pendent personal
jurisdiction must fall under specific personal jurisdiction’s
Fourteenth Amendment relatedness element, as it is defined in
Bristol-Myers. As discussed in Section II.B, pendent personal
jurisdiction in the federal courts will usually be evaluated
under the Fourteenth Amendment, as the federal courts
generally rely on state law to maintain personal jurisdiction.
Thus, it is important to introduce the relatedness element. In
short, the relatedness element reflects a historical commitment
to interstate federalism by balancing among the competing
sovereigns within the United States.
A. Personal Jurisdiction’s Relatedness Element
In 1945, the Court ushered in the modern era of personal
jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 194 which
upheld out-of-state service of process in a large set of cases
implicating what would eventually come to be called specific
personal jurisdiction. 195 International Shoe’s language sets
modest limitations on assertions of specific personal
jurisdiction by the states. The defendant must merely have
“certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
194. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
195. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (introducing the terms “specific” and “general”
personal jurisdiction).

2018]

RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS

263

fair play and substantial justice.’” 196 But not just any minimum
contacts suffice. As the Court explained, “the casual presence of
the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated
items of activities in a state on the corporation’s behalf are not
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with
the activities there.” 197 This birthed the relatedness element: a
defendant is only subject to jurisdiction in a forum state if it had
contacts related to the claim there. Although the Court has
established additional requirements for specific personal
jurisdiction since International Shoe, this Article focuses on the
relatedness element.
Until recently, the Court paid little attention to specific
personal jurisdiction’s relatedness element, 198 allowing the
lower courts to develop a wide variety of tests. 199 In part,
International Shoe enabled this diversity because it used three
different phrases to describe the relatedness element: “related
to,” “connected with,” and “arising from.” 200 The “arising from”
language, although itself elastic, is noticeably narrower than
“related to.” 201 An “arising from or related to” element would
thus require a looser relationship between the claim and the
forum state for specific personal jurisdiction than would an
“arising from” standard. 202
196. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
197. See id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
198. In Helicopteros, the Court flagged the question but declined to address it. See
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10 (1984). Dissenting, Justice
Brennan advocated for a broad definition, favoring easy availability of specific personal
jurisdiction. See id. at 427 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A] court’s specific jurisdiction should be
applicable whenever the cause of action arises out of or relates to the contacts between
the defendant and the forum.”).
199. See, e.g., Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1078 (10th Cir.
2008) (describing three different approaches courts have adopted). See generally SILBERMAN,
STEIN & WOLFF, supra note 107, at 89; Borchers, supra note 2, at 434–35.
200. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318–20 (using all three terms); see also Borchers, supra note
2, at 433 (identifying the problem and labeling the three terms as “synonyms”).
201. In Helicopteros, the majority suggested a claim could satisfy one standard but not the
other, though it did not define the difference between them. 466 U.S. at 415 n.10; accord Lea
Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 737 (1988) (identifying
the problem).
202. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119,
126 (making this observation).
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Working with these different phrases, courts have developed
a spectrum of approaches. On the spectrum’s more demanding
end, the First and Eighth Circuits established a “proximate
cause” standard, holding that the defendant’s forum-state
contacts must be an “important, or perhaps even a material
element of proof” in the plaintiff’s case. 203 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit has embraced a looser “but for” standard, deeming the
“relatedness” element satisfied if the plaintiff’s claim would not
have arisen “but for” the defendant’s forum-state contacts. 204
On the spectrum’s least demanding end stands the California
Supreme Court’s decision in Cornelison v. Chaney. 205 After the
defendant’s employee, a truck driver, hit the plaintiff’s
decedent in Nevada, the plaintiff brought suit in California. 206
The court concluded that the Nevada accident, together with
the defendant’s other California trucking operations, created a
sufficient relationship between the claim and California,
stating: “The accident arose out of the driving of the truck, the
very activity which was the essential basis of defendant’s
contacts with this state. These factors demonstrate, in our view,
a substantial nexus between plaintiff’s cause of action and
defendant’s activities in California.” 207 Cornelison’s relatedness
standard is loose; the defendant’s forum contacts do not even
need to be a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury. Other courts
have staked middle positions. 208
In 2017, the Court finally confronted the meaning of the
relatedness element in Bristol-Myers. 209 The case featured a mass
203. See Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Hahn v. Vermont
Law School, 698 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1983)); Pearrow v. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067,
1068–69 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Borchers, supra note 2, at 434–35.
204. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499
U.S. 585 (1991).
205. 16 Cal. 3d 143 (1976); see also Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations
on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 83–84 (analyzing the case and evaluating
varying degrees of relatedness between the defendant’s contacts and a claim).
206. See Cornelison, 16 Cal. 3d at 146.
207. See id.
208. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007) (adopting a butfor test “hew[ing] closely to the reciprocity principle upon which specific jurisdiction rests”).
209. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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action against the pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers
Squibb (BMS) for alleged defects in Plavix, its well-known
blood thinner drug. The plaintiffs—Plavix consumers from
thirty-four states—attempted to join with each other against
BMS in a California state court. 210 BMS defended itself by
arguing the California court only had personal jurisdiction over
it as to the California plaintiffs’ claims, and not as to claims
brought by out-of-state plaintiffs who had neither purchased
nor consumed Plavix in California. 211
One is tempted to ask, “What’s wrong with California?” 212
BMS had plenty of contacts in California: it employed
thousands of people and sold billions of dollars’ worth of Plavix
there. 213 Litigating the out-of-state claims in California also did
not seem unreasonable, since BMS was already being forced to
litigate the California claims there, and San Francisco was more
convenient for BMS than the various state courts the out-ofstate plaintiffs would otherwise have to file in. 214 In short, BMS’s
only real argument was that the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims
did not “arise from” its contacts with California.
After the plaintiffs won at trial and before the intermediate
appellate court, the California Supreme Court agreed that
specific personal jurisdiction existed as to the out-of-state
claims. 215 Concluding that BMS had purposefully availed itself
of California, the justices confronted the question of how related
a claim must be to the defendant’s California contacts. 216 They
adopted a “sliding scale approach,” under which “the more
210. The plaintiffs were able to avoid removal to federal court under the Class Action
Fairness Act. See Andrew Bradt & Theodore D. Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: BristolMyers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1268 (2018).
211. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
212. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 210, at 1253.
213. See id.
214. During oral arguments, Justice Kennedy made this point. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 4, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No.
16-466).
215. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 5th 783 (2016). The court also
concluded that general personal jurisdiction did not exist. Id. at 883–84 (noting that BMS was
not “at home” under the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler).
216. See id. at 801–02.
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wide-ranging a defendant’s forum contacts, the more readily is
shown a connection between the forum contacts and the
claim.” 217 Applying its test, the court held that because
Bristol-Myers’ contacts with California are
substantial and the company had enjoyed
sizeable revenues from the sales of its product
here—the very product that is the subject of all of
the claims of the plaintiffs . . . Bristol-Myers’
extensive contacts with California establish
minimum contacts based on a less direct
connection between Bristol-Myers’ forum
activities and plaintiffs’ claims than might
otherwise be required. 218
The court also decided that jurisdiction was reasonable and that
exercising jurisdiction would advance judicial efficiency. 219
The Supreme Court decisively rejected this sliding scale
approach, though it provided limited clarity on the relatedness
element. Writing for the Court, Justice Alito stated that
California’s approach would blur the line between specific and
general personal jurisdiction. 220 As for the relatedness element,
Justice Alito noted, “What is needed—and what is missing
here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims
at issue.” 221 In other words, the plaintiffs needed some
connection between their claims and the forum state.
Apparently, the similarity between the California claims and
the out-of-state claims did not qualify as some connection to
California. 222 At the same time, the Court did not take up BMS’s

217. See id. at 802.
218. See id. at 806.
219. See id. at 808–13.
220. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)
(explaining that California’s approach “resembles a loose and spurious form of general
jurisdiction”).
221. See id.
222. Contra Cornelison, 16 Cal. 3d at 149.

2018]

RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS

267

suggested “proximate cause” test for relatedness, fostering
continued uncertainty about the relatedness element. 223
Combined with the Court’s tightening of general personal
jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 224 Bristol-Myers will make
nationwide mass and class actions more difficult to aggregate,
particularly in cases involving multiple defendants
headquartered in different states. 225 After Daimler, scholars
proposed work-arounds. One suggestion focused on expanding
general personal jurisdiction by relying on state statutes
deeming consent to jurisdiction by corporations doing business
within the state, 226 though several courts and scholars agree this
proposal rests on dubious constitutional grounds. 227 Another
suggestion is the concept of pendent personal jurisdiction,
which the Bristol-Myers’ plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried out in
the California appellate court. 228 Although they failed, litigants
in dozens of recent cases are invoking pendent party personal
jurisdiction, especially in nationwide class actions. If successful,
they can effectively shield class actions from the Court’s
personal jurisdiction cases.

223. See Brief for Petitioner at 37–46, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137
S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466).
224. 571 U.S. 117 (2014). There, the Court held that a defendant corporation is usually only
subject to general personal jurisdiction in its state of incorporation and where its principal place
of business is. Id. at 137.
225. Some courts are resisting this interpretation of Bristol-Myers, though this Article argues
that resistance is improper. See infra notes 257-89 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 4, at 258–63.
227. See, e.g., Famular v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 CV 944 (VB), 2017 WL 2470844, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
June 7, 2017) (interpreting the Court’s decision in Daimler to invalidate consent statutes as a
basis for general personal jurisdiction); Brilmayer et al., supra note 201, at 757 (“The most
formidable constitutional issue surrounding general jurisdiction by consent arises when
consent derives from a statutorily required appointment.”). But see Verity Winship, Jurisdiction
over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1185–
86 (acknowledging that “[w]ith few exceptions . . . the implied consent statutes have been used
without challenge as the basis for jurisdiction in most of Delaware’s corporate governance cases
ever since Delaware declared them constitutional in 1980”).
228. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 439 (2014).
Professors Rhodes and Robertson, supra note 4, at 243–52, make the suggestion.
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B. The Resurgence of Interstate Federalism
Bristol-Myers requires “a connection between the forum and
the specific claims at issue” 229 for personal jurisdiction. To
understand what this rule means for pendent personal
jurisdiction, this Article examines the reason it exists: interstate
federalism.
The Court has had an on-and-off relationship with interstate
federalism in its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. In WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 230 Justice White justified the
Court’s decision to reject Oklahoma’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction because it was inconvenient to the defendant and
violated interstate federalism principles. 231 As to interstate
federalism, the Court explained:
we have never accepted the proposition that state
lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor
could we, and remain faithful to the principles of
interstate
federalism
embodied
in
the
Constitution . . . . the Framers also intended that
the States retain many essential attributes of
sovereignty, including, in particular, the
sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The
sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a
limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister
States—a limitation express or implicit in both the
original scheme of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 232

229. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
230. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
231. See id. at 291–92 (“The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform
two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system.”).
232. Id. at 292.
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Justice White, however, explicitly repudiated this passage in
Bauxites, suggesting interstate federalism did not operate “as an
independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court.” 233
As he explained it, the source of authority for the World-Wide
Volkswagen rule is the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects
individual liberty while making “no mention of federalism
concerns.” 234 Yet in Bristol-Myers, the Court stridently
reembraced interstate federalism. Indeed, the Court quoted the
very passage from World-Wide Volkswagen that Justice White
had denounced as erroneous in Bauxites. 235 Moreover, Justice
Alito gave a full-throated defense of interstate federalism’s role
in personal jurisdiction.
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor asked a good question:
“What interest could any single State have in adjudicating
respondents’ claims that the other states do not share?” 236
Justice Alito’s opinion answered by noting that personal
jurisdiction “encompasses the more abstract matter of
submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little
legitimate interest in the claims in question.” 237 In other words,
some states have an interest in adjudicating claims, and others
either have no interest or too weak an interest. This language
suggests the states may compete to assert jurisdiction. 238 But
states cannot always assert jurisdiction when they want to. As
Justice Alito noted, “The sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s]
a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States.” 239 Thus,

233. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982).
234. Id.
235. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen for the proposition
that interstate federalism limits assertions of personal jurisdiction and stating it “may be
decisive”).
236. See id. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 1780 (emphasis added).
238. See also Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of
the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT. & COMP. L. 111, 113 (1999) (arguing that the linkage between state
law on jurisdiction and federal constitutional law may “encourage a race to the bottom, as state
lawmakers consider either the interests of their residents or the interests of their lawyers in
securing access to a local forum and do not want to suffer comparative disadvantage”).
239. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)).
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although an isolated state may have the sovereign power to
adjudicate claims with no connection to it, that power is limited
by the sovereignty of other states, which also have interests in
adjudicating claims. Applied to the case’s facts, Justice Alito’s
logic meant that states other than California had an interest in
adjudicating the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims. The Court’s rule
therefore reserved adjudicatory power to them.
C. What Role Does Interstate Federalism Play in Personal
Jurisdiction?
Scholars may wince at its resurgence, 240 but interstate
federalism is the driving force behind the Court’s decision in
Bristol-Myers. 241 But why? At first glance, it makes little sense.
What does interstate federalism have to do with an individual’s
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest? Like many traditions,
personal jurisdiction does not make perfect sense if summoned
to the altar of modern reason. 242 We must examine the history.
In our ongoing dispute between Capias and RespondendCo,
imagine instead that Capias traveled to Paraguay and sued
RespondendCo there, and that Paraguay’s courts cooperated
and issued the judgment. If Capias tried to enforce the
240. Interstate federalism’s role in personal jurisdiction is deeply contested, with most
scholars arguing it should not be relevant. See, e.g., Robert R. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward
a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 83–86
(1984) (arguing that the focus on state sovereignty in personal jurisdiction promotes wasteful
litigation and does not make theoretical sense); John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal
Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1057–58 (1983) (arguing that interstate federalism is not
relevant to personal jurisdiction and that state sovereignty will not be harmed by eliminating
its consideration); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A
Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1137 (1981); Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process
Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 503
(1984). But see James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Personal Jurisdiction, 90 VA.
L. REV. 169 (2004) (arguing that personal jurisdiction rules should account for interstate
federalism).
241. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–29, 37–38, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466) (featuring invocations of interstate
federalism in personal jurisdiction by Justices Gorsuch, Kagan, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Breyer).
242. Cf. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 8 (1991)
(criticizing those who aggressively bring society’s “political, legal, and institutional
inheritance” before “the tribunal of intellect”).
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judgment in an American court, the effort would almost
certainly fail under standard international law principles. 243 The
basic idea is that Paraguay would be overreaching, and that the
United States’ own sovereignty would entitle it to enforce limits
on Paraguay’s. 244
A similar scenario commonly played out in early American
history. The states were once independent sovereigns.
Although the Constitution tore down some lines between the
states and eliminated some of their powers, the states retained
essential elements of sovereignty, including their equality to
each other. 245 Thus, the states were, in some ways, foreign to one
another, including in the recognition of judgments. 246 If sued
out-of-state, defendants would frequently just default, leaving
the plaintiff attempting to enforce the judgment in the
defendant’s home state. 247 In those situations, state courts drew
on traditional rules of international recognition in deciding
whether to enforce another state’s judgment. 248 The most
important rule was that a judgment was not valid unless the
defendant was served with process within the issuing state’s
territory. Out-of-state service was seen as overreach. A state
could purport to do it, but other states would not be forced to
recognize an ensuing judgment. 249

243. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 2014) (“A
court in the United States will not recognize a judgment of a court of a foreign state if . . . . the
court that rendered the judgment did not have personal jurisdiction over the party resisting
recognition . . . .”).
244. See id. § 400 (“States have the right to preserve their sovereignty. Accordingly, they
validly may resist recognition and enforcement if they view a foreign judgment as the product
of deficiencies or significant differences in the law or procedure of the foreign forum.”).
245. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) (“Each state stands on the same level with
all the rest.”); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild
learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the
[f]ederal [g]overnment.”).
246. See Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1273 (2017) (“Early
American states stood in much the same way as foreign nations.”).
247. See id. at 1271 (noting that “[i]n the early Republic, jurisdiction was frequently raised at
the recognition stage” of litigation once a party tried to enforce a judgment already won).
248. See id. at 1273–78 (documenting historical practice and acknowledging ambiguity on
the source of these rules).
249. See id. at 1281–82.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court enforced these traditional
principles. Although the Court could not, on direct review,
police state court assertions of personal jurisdiction because
they presented no federal question, it could ensure compliance
with the Full Faith and Credit Clause at the recognition stage. 250
And the Court only required states to enforce judgments that
comported with traditional principles. 251 As Stephen Sachs
documents, the Fourteenth Amendment changed the manner of
federal supervision but not the content of it. 252 It allowed the
Court to directly review state court judgments rendered
without due process. And a state asserting jurisdiction beyond
its sovereignty was understood to deny due process. 253
In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes a
liberty interest in not being subject to jurisdiction by a state
reaching beyond its sovereignty in a system of interstate
federalism. By protecting that liberty interest, the Court
enforces an equilibrium between the states. Although Pennoyer
v. Neff’s in-state service rule has given way to International Shoe’s
minimum contacts standard, Pennoyer’s basic regime still exists.
International Shoe’s minimum contacts rule still focuses on
territorial contacts, making state borders central to the inquiry.
If anything, International Shoe strengthened the Court’s role in
policing interstate federalism by articulating the relatedness
element, empowering the Supreme Court to decide whether a
claim was related to the forum state.
Let us return to Justice Sotomayor’s question: “What interest
could any single State have in adjudicating respondents’ claims

250. See id. at 1280–82.
251. See, e.g., D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 176 (1850) (“[T]he international law as it
existed among the States in 1790 was, that a judgment rendered in one State, assuming to bind
the person of a citizen of another, was void within the foreign State, when the defendant had
not been served with process . . . .”); Sachs, supra note 246, at 1280–82.
252. See Sachs, supra note 246, at 1288 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment altered the prevailing
jurisdictional rules by adjusting the mechanisms of appellate review.”).
253. See id. at 1288–89; see also Daniel Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts:
Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. Briggs, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 713, 715 (2015)
(“[T]he Court has made federalism an integral part of its due process jurisprudence by stating
that a defendant has a liberty interest in being subjected only to lawful judgments.”).
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that the other states do not share?” 254 It is the same interest a
state had pre-Fourteenth Amendment: protecting its own
sovereignty by refusing to recognize a sister state’s overreach.
The key difference is that the Supreme Court on direct review,
rather than the states at the recognition phase, now protects this
interest. Even if California would like to dispense its sense of
justice in resolving claims arising in other states, it cannot do so
because other states have the same desire. Without some federal
policing, plaintiffs could pick any forum they desired, allowing
pro-plaintiff states to essentially force their law on individuals
in other states. To those committed to preserving basic equality
and peace among the states, personal jurisdiction’s relatedness
element is an important tool.
IV. PENDENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION AFTER BRISTOL-MYERS
After a long history of obscurity, the Court’s decision in
Bristol-Myers provides an opportunity to reconsider the
relationship between federal courts and pendent personal
jurisdiction. Indeed, the case and the doctrine are linked.
Attempting to shield class actions from Bristol-Myers’
implications, courts have expanded pendent claim personal
jurisdiction to facilitate the easier joinder of parties via pendent
party personal jurisdiction. 255 This Article argues that the
Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Bristol-Myers,
currently bars the federal courts from exercising both forms of
pendent personal jurisdiction.
At the start, it is worth clarifying what I am not arguing. This
Article is not suggesting that Congress lacks the power to
authorize either pendent party or pendent claim personal
jurisdiction. There are undoubtedly valid policy arguments in
favor of pendent personal jurisdiction. 256 If Congress decided
254. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1788 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
255. See supra Section I.C.
256. Either form of pendent personal jurisdiction would arguably facilitate the more efficient
resolution of disputes by the federal courts. Pendent claim personal jurisdiction would
generally not impose a substantial burden on defendants, as the anchor claim would already
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that public policy favored legislative reform, that law would be
evaluated under the Fifth Amendment. Under the Fifth
Amendment, it would not be difficult for the plaintiffs in a
particular case to establish that their claim arises from contacts
with the territory of the relevant sovereign: the United States.
Instead, this Article argues that Congress simply has not
authorized the federal courts to exercise either type of pendent
personal jurisdiction. At least in most cases, a federal court
cannot wield broader personal jurisdiction than the state court
across the street. Because the federal courts must usually rely
on the same state long-arm statutes as the state courts, both
types of courts typically confront the same Fourteenth
Amendment limitations—motivated largely by interstate
federalism concerns—on personal jurisdiction articulated by
the Supreme Court. Because Congress has not expanded the
scope of the federal courts’ process, the federal courts cannot
maintain pendent personal jurisdiction.
A. Pendent Party Personal Jurisdiction
Dozens of district courts have confronted the issue of pendent
party personal jurisdiction within the last year. However,
Bristol-Myers should be understood to rule it out, effectively
limiting where multistate mass and class actions can be
brought. This is undoubtedly a significant legal development.

force them to litigate in a particular forum. Cf. Bradt & Rave, supra note 210, at 1253 (observing
that it was not logistically inconvenient for BMS to litigate the out-of-state claims in California
because it had to litigate the in-state claims there). On the other hand, both types would promote
forum shopping by plaintiffs, especially those bringing state-law claims. They would likely seek
to benefit from the Supreme Court’s decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., which held
that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive choice-of-law
rules of the state it sits in, thus often allowing plaintiffs to forum shop for the favorable
substantive laws of particular states. 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941) (“The conflict of laws rules to be
applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state
courts.”). That risk arguably creates interstate federalism problems by effectively allowing the
substantive laws of pro-plaintiff states to govern disputes from around the country.
Admittedly, pendent claim personal jurisdiction would represent a substantially more modest
step in this direction than pendent party personal jurisdiction. The former doctrine (absent a
nationwide service of process statute) requires that an individual plaintiff bring at least one
claim with some connection to the forum state, whereas the latter features no such limitation.
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Crucially, the Court noted that “a connection between the
forum and the specific claims at issue” is required. 257 Consider
the Court’s analysis of the facts in Bristol-Myers as they pertain
to the relatedness element:
The [California] Supreme Court found that
specific jurisdiction was present without
identifying any adequate link between the State
and the nonresidents’ claims. As noted, the
nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in
California, did not purchase Plavix in California,
did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not
injured by Plavix in California. 258
Put another way, the Court demands a link between the
forum state and each of the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims.
Speaking even more directly to the point, the Court declared
that third-party relationships do not authorize circumventing
this rule:
The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed,
obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—and
allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the
nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert
specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.
As we have explained, a defendant’s relationship
with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction. This remains
true even when third parties (here, the plaintiffs
who reside in California) can bring claims similar
to those brought by the nonresidents. 259

257. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
258. See id.
259. See id. (quotations omitted).
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The key takeaway is that a defendant’s relationship with a
third party does not enable specific personal jurisdiction. That
is the entire rationale behind pendent party personal
jurisdiction, so Bristol-Myers plainly rules it out.
Courts and litigants have advanced three arguments to avoid
this conclusion. First, a small number of district courts have
claimed that Bristol-Myers only applies to state courts, and not
to federal courts. 260 They have noted that the Court explicitly
left open the question of whether its decision applied to the
federal courts. 261 However, as one district court observed, the
Court reserved that issue because it was not presented in the
case before it; there is no need to unduly infer from its
prudential reservation. 262 Additionally, as one district court
recently reasoned, it seems odd that concerns rooted in
interstate federalism could limit the federal courts, instruments
of a sovereignty higher than the states. 263 At first blush, this
argument seems logical. However, as discussed above, it is well
settled that federal court assertions of pendent personal
jurisdiction are generally governed by state law, and hence
subject to the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.264
If this seems odd, the Court applied this framework in both
Daimler and Walden v. Fiore. 265 Moreover, the federal courts’
personal jurisdiction has been tethered to state boundaries since

260. See, e.g., Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 859 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018);
supra Section I.C.1.
261. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783–84 (“Since our decision concerns the due process
limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the
Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a
federal court.”).
262. See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL
4224723, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (“Fitzhenry-Russell confuses the Supreme Court’s
leaving the issue . . . open with the Supreme Court affirmatively stating that BristolMyers necessarily would not apply to federal courts. Because the Bristol-Myers fact pattern did
not involve a federal court, there was no reason for the Supreme Court to confront that issue.”).
263. See Sloan, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 859.
264. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
265. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 125–29 (2014) (detailing the analytical
framework when a federal court asserts personal jurisdiction under state law); Walden v. Fiore,
134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (analyzing Nevada federal court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction
under Court’s Fourteenth Amendment cases).
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1789. 266 In other words, it’s nothing new. Unsurprisingly, the
majority of courts that have considered this issue have
concluded that Bristol-Myers does apply to the federal courts.
Second, a small number of courts have suggested that BristolMyers may apply to federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction, but not federal question jurisdiction. 267 This
rationale does not withstand scrutiny. The requirement that a
federal court have statutory authorization to wield personal
jurisdiction applies regardless of what type of subject matter
jurisdiction the court is applying. Unless a federal claim is
created by a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of
process, the federal court must rely on the long-arm statute of
the state it sits in. Since most federal laws do not include
nationwide service of process provisions, the analysis usually
entails the same two questions as when a federal court exercises
diversity jurisdiction: does the state long-arm statute authorize
jurisdiction, and is it consistent with the Court’s Fourteenth
Amendment cases? 268 When a federal statute does authorize
nationwide process, pendent party personal jurisdiction is
unnecessary. Either way, the type of subject matter jurisdiction
wielded by a federal court is irrelevant. The relevant statute and
its attendant constitutional limitations are what matter.
Third, a greater number of courts have insisted Bristol-Myers
does not apply to class actions. 269 Several district courts have
carefully differentiated between the mass action at issue in
Bristol-Myers and class actions. They have suggested that,
unlike in mass actions, absent class members are not true
parties to the litigation. 270 They have also pointed to other

266. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Section I.C.2.
268. For an example of a case that identifies this clearly, see Roy v. Fed-Ex Ground Package
Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-30116-KAR, 2018 WL 2324092, at *3 (D. Mass. May 22, 2018).
269. See supra Section I.C.3.
270. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1365 (N.D.
Ga. 2018) (“In a mass tort action such as Bristol–Myers, each plaintiff is a real party in interest,
meaning that each plaintiff is personally named and required to effect service. In contrast,
claims asserted in a class action, such as those in the action presently before the Court, are
prosecuted through representatives on behalf of absent class members.” (citations omitted)).
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special rules that apply to class actions, like the fact that the
absent class members’ citizenship does not affect diversity
jurisdiction. 271 One can also observe that some courts have not
required plaintiffs to prove that all absent class members have
standing. 272 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that
nonnamed plaintiffs “may be parties for some purposes and not
for others . . . based on context.” 273
Here, context suggests that nonnamed plaintiffs are parties
for personal jurisdiction purposes. First, personal jurisdiction
concerns a defendant’s personal right to Fourteenth Amendment
due process. 274 In contrast, special rules for diversity
jurisdiction and standing concern the federal courts’ power,
implicating the personal rights of litigants only indirectly. 275
271. See, e.g., id. at 1369; see also Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (stating that courts
need not consider the citizenship of absent class members when confirming diversity
jurisdiction). In Sanchez, the court cited Shutts to argue that Bristol-Myers does not apply. See
Sanchez, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1369 (“If due process was not offended in Shutts, a class-action in
State court with absent non-resident plaintiff class members, it is not offended by a potential
class-action in federal court where the plaintiff class is made up in part with non-resident
members.”). This misinterprets Shutts, where the defendant argued the plaintiffs’ due process
rights were violated. The defendant did not suggest that its own due process right was violated,
presumably because it thought itself subject to general personal jurisdiction in a pre-Daimler
world. In Shutts, the Court emphasized that due process rules were different for absent class
members because litigation burdened them less than defendants. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985). Shutts is simply not relevant in this context.
272. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 306 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“[W]hether an action presents a ‘case or controversy’ under Article III is determined
vis-a-vis the named parties.”).
273. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
274. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
(“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest.
It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty.”).
275 275. One could argue that this question implicates the longstanding debate on the nature of
the class action. One camp suggests that class actions are merely a form of joinder, while the
other articulates a “representational model, [which] places much greater importance on the
named class representative.” Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational
Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459, 460. Although this debate is deeply interesting, I do not think it
is particularly relevant to the question of whether pendent party personal jurisdiction is
legitimate when class actions are involved. The representational model’s focus on the named
representative will explain some unique rules for class actions, but not others. For example,
Judge Wood explains that embracing the representational model over the joinder model should
lead one to be less concerned about the personal jurisdiction rights of absent plaintiff members
of the class, because Rule 23’s requirement that they be adequately represented by the named
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Acknowledging the need for flexible federal court power to
adjudicate class actions does not necessarily justify eliminating
defendants’ personal rights. Further, defendants have a
practical interest in seeing this right respected; exempting class
actions from the Bristol-Myers framework would potentially
allow one plaintiff to subject a defendant to nationwide liability
under any state’s laws, enabling extreme forum shopping
capabilities. Second and relatedly, suggesting that defendants’
rights vary in mass actions versus class actions runs up against
the Rules Enabling Act, which mandates that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 cannot alter defendants’ substantive
rights. 276 Third, the Court’s solicitude for interstate federalism
clashes with carving an exception for class actions. Indeed,
particular states (and the federal courts sitting within) have a
reputation for liberally certifying multistate class actions
encompassing claims from other states. 277 Arguably, a
multistate class action is the manner in which a state can most
aggressively assert its court system at the expense of other
states, thus causing interstate federalism damage. 278 Finally, this
approach effects an end-run around Bristol-Myers. It would
allow plaintiffs to enable a state (or a federal court sitting
within) to adjudicate claims unrelated to it simply by using
class representatives from that state. Indeed, one California
district court explicitly blessed this effort, acknowledging it was

plaintiffs protects their interests. See id. at 504–05. It is difficult to see how that logic would
support watering down a defendant’s due process right to be exposed to liability only by courts
authorized to adjudicate all the claims against it.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.”).
277. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, California’s Food Court: Where Lawyers Never Go Hungry,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2013, 6:21 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0822/californias-food-court-where-lawyers-never-go-hungry (describing the pro-consumer class
action reputation of California’s federal courts).
278. This was a driving motivation behind the Class Action Fairness Act. See S. REP. No. 10914 (2005) (“[F]requently in such cases [where certain state courts certified nationwide class
actions], there appears to be state court provincialism against out-of-state defendants or a
judicial failure to recognize the interests of other states in the litigation.”).
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letting plaintiffs “manipulate[] their complaint so as not to run
afoul of Bristol-Myers.” 279 The Court will likely not let plaintiffs
circumvent its ruling. 280
In short, Bristol-Myers applies in federal court and to class
actions. Admittedly, personal jurisdiction rules are making it
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring multistate class actions on
their preferred terms, especially where defendants are not
amenable to general personal jurisdiction. 281 Wishful thinking
about Bristol-Myers—which demands a connection between
each claim and the forum state—will not ultimately counter that
tide. Although some lower courts have suggested Bristol-Myers,
which purported to modestly extend existing precedent, was
not intended to impact class actions, nothing in Court’s
reasoning suggests a carveout is forthcoming. 282 It is also
difficult to argue the Court was unaware of the decision’s
potential impact on class actions. Indeed, an amicus brief
warned that deciding in BMS’s favor would cause “dramatic”
consequences for multistate class actions, whereby the “only
available forum would [often] be in the defendant's home
state.” 283 Because pendent party personal jurisdiction in class
actions does not require a connection between each claim and
the forum state, it is inconsistent with the Court’s decision.
Moreover, it is not the role of the federal courts to expand
their own jurisdiction for policy reasons. Fundamentally, the
Constitution empowers Congress to define the jurisdiction of

279. Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-00564, 2017 WL 4224723,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017).
280. See also Dodson, supra note 4, at 31 (stating that the argument against Bristol-Myers’
applicability to class actions “seems to be in tension with the Supreme Court’s current trend
narrowing personal jurisdiction and its current skepticism of class aggregation”).
281. See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, supra note 210, 1318–19.
282. See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 532 (“Nothing in Justice Alito’s opinion provides
a plausible ground for distinguishing class actions . . . from the consolidated mass actions before
the Court.”).
283. Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors in Support of Respondents at 1617, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466).
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the federal courts. 284 Within a system of separated powers,
Congress’s prerogative suggests the federal courts, at most,
have a limited ability to expand their own jurisdiction. 285 One
longstanding limitation—first established by Congress in the
Judiciary Act of 1789 286 and now codified in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure by the Supreme Court’s exercise of delegated
legislative authority 287—is that federal courts must have
statutory authority to wield personal jurisdiction.
At the very least, Congress has left undisturbed a rule that
often has the effect of tying federal court jurisdiction to state
borders. 288 In cases where a federal court relies on a state longarm statute to maintain personal jurisdiction, it is well

284. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (How.) 441, 449 (1850); see also See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
(“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
285. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547 (1989) (“[C]ourts which are created by
written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that
jurisdiction.” (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807))).
286. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the role of the Judiciary Act in
this history is not entirely clear. Scholars and judges have debated whether the Judiciary Act
regulated personal jurisdiction, merely the method of service of process, or venue. Compare
Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l., 320 F.2d 219, 228 n.10 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J.) (asserting
that section 11 of the Judiciary Act merely regulated venue and not personal jurisdiction), with
id. at 238 (Clark, J., dissenting) (asserting that section 11 of the Judiciary Act regulated both
personal jurisdiction and venue), and Foster, Jr., supra note 152, at 79 n.15 (agreeing with Judge
Clark’s view). Even if one concludes section 11 of the Judiciary Act had nothing to do with
personal jurisdiction, others have argued that section 34 of the Judiciary Act, better known as
the Rules of Decision Act, requires federal courts to sometimes rely on the long-arm statute of
the states they sit in. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
711–12 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Kelleher, supra note 142, at 1211–12 (agreeing
with Justice Powell’s interpretation). Under either view, Congress has, since 1789, regulated the
personal jurisdiction of the federal courts.
287. For an explanation of how the Supreme Court exercises delegated legislative authority
under the Rules Enabling Act, see Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Class Actions,
Statutes of Limitations and Repose, and Federal Common Law, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (2018).
288. It is somewhat unclear whether this status quo is based solely on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k), or whether it is also required by statute. For example, Justice Powell argued in
Bauxites that the Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts to rely on state long-arm statutes
for personal jurisdiction in diversity cases. See Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 711 (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment). That theoretical question aside, Congress can change the status quo if it wants to.
Several scholars have noted that Congress can untether the personal jurisdiction of the federal
courts from state borders. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1192 (2018) (“[A]lthough federal districts have always been
organized according to state boundaries, they need not be under Article III, which gives
Congress leeway to design a system of inferior courts as it sees fit.”).

282

DREXEL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:215

established that the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment rules
apply, meaning that geography limits the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 289 Indeed, the Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers
represents merely a continuation of traditional geographical
limitations. Pendent party personal jurisdiction, if accepted,
would destroy these limitations by allowing a federal court in
any state to adjudicate similar claims from all fifty states as long
as one plaintiff’s claim is connected to the state it sits in. In other
words, it would be a dramatic expansion of the power of
particular federal courts to adjudicate controversies—whether
arising under state or federal law—from around the country.
Whether motivated by a desire to facilitate judicial efficiency or
to enable multistate class actions where the defendant is not
amenable to general personal jurisdiction, federal courts play a
constitutionally dubious game when they press the boundaries
of their own jurisdiction for policy reasons. Undoubtedly, there
are valid policy arguments in favor of adjusting jurisdictional
rules to make it easier for plaintiffs to bring class actions. But
because the Constitution empowers Congress to decide
whether to expand the federal courts’ jurisdiction, the courts
should proceed cautiously in this area, lest they disturb the
separation of powers.
B. Pendent Claim Personal Jurisdiction
During oral arguments for Bristol-Myers, Justice Sotomayor
presciently suggested BMS’s stance would imperil pendent
claim personal jurisdiction. 290 First, this section affirms her
concern. Although it may have once been an open question, the
Court made clear that specific personal jurisdiction is a claim-

289. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Of course, there are exceptions. The Court’s
general personal jurisdiction rules, prior to Daimler, were understood to effectively allow
plaintiffs to sue major national corporations in most states for any cause of action. See Dodson,
supra note 4, at 18 (citing Wal-Mart as an example of such a corporation).
290. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466); see also Dodson, supra note 4, at 29 (stating that BristolMyers can be read to prohibit pendent claim personal jurisdiction); Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at
529–30 (stating that pendent personal jurisdiction’s status is “unsettled” after Bristol-Myers).
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specific inquiry. Consequently, pendent claim personal
jurisdiction cannot survive under existing law.
Second, this section will confront some broader questions
about specific personal jurisdiction. How close of a relationship
does the relatedness element require between the defendant’s
forum-state contacts and a claim, and what role does interstate
federalism play? This Article concludes that Bristol-Myers left
these questions open and offers suggestions for further
doctrinal development of the relatedness element.
Finally, this section observes that courts may have an
alternative jurisdictional option in some cases where pendent
claim personal jurisdiction has been incorrectly applied.
1. Specific personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry, so
pendent claim personal jurisdiction is forbidden
Bristol-Myers confirms that specific personal jurisdiction is a
claim-specific inquiry. This question is essential because
pendent claim personal jurisdiction’s validity depends on it not
being a claim-specific inquiry. Consider, for example, the facts
of ESAB Group v. Centricut, Inc.: using the RICO statute’s
nationwide service of process provision to bring RICO claims,
the plaintiff also brought state-law claims in a South Carolina
federal court concerning activities by the defendant with no
connection to South Carolina. 291 If specific personal jurisdiction
is a claim-specific inquiry, pendent personal jurisdiction in
cases like ESAB is invalid, because the state-law claims cannot
independently satisfy the relatedness element.
The Court’s language in Bristol-Myers suggests specific
personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry. For example,
the Court states that a “connection between the forum and
specific claims at issue” is required. 292 The Court’s criticism of
California’s approach highlights the centrality of this assertion:

291. See 126 F.3d 617, 625–26 (4th Cir. 1997).
292. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (emphasis added).
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Under the California approach, the strength of the
requisite connection between the forum and the
specific claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant
has extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to
those claims. Our cases provide no support for
this approach, which resembles a loose and
spurious form of general jurisdiction. For specific
jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections
with the forum are not enough. 293
Notice that the Court refers to “specific claims.” It is
irrelevant if the defendant has “extensive forum contacts that
are unrelated” to those specific claims. The implication is that
each claim in a lawsuit must be related to the forum state.
This is true even though Justice Alito quoted more
ambiguous language from earlier cases. Quoting Helicopteros
and Daimler, the Court said specific personal jurisdiction rules
require that the “suit must ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” 294 The Court did not use
the narrower word “claim,” but the more ambiguous word
“suit.” A “suit” can seemingly refer either to a claim or the
broader lawsuit. 295 Quoting Goodyear Dunlop, the Court said
there must be:
an affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity
or an occurrence that takes place in the forum
State and is therefore subject to the State’s
regulation . . . . specific jurisdiction is confined to
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected

293. See id.
294. See id. (emphasis added).
295. Indeed, one court has seized upon this ambiguity to justify pendent party personal
jurisdiction as to unnamed class plaintiffs. See Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00085,
2018 WL 3580775, at *6 (W.D. Va. July 25, 2018) (quoting the Court’s use of the word “suit” to
argue it “framed the substantive right at [a] level of generality” justifying its decision).
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with, the very
jurisdiction. 296

controversy

that

establishes

Again, the word controversy is amenable to either the narrow
meaning of “claim” or the broader meaning of “claims within a
controversy.”
However, the Court’s underlying logic suggests that specific
personal jurisdiction must be a claim-specific inquiry. The
Court demands separation between specific and general
personal jurisdiction, insisting they are “very different” from
each other. 297 Therefore, specific personal jurisdiction must be a
claim-specific inquiry. Central to its definition is that it covers
claims with a specific connection to the forum state. Ever since
Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman coined
the terms, the defining difference between general and specific
personal jurisdiction is that only the latter requires a
relationship between a claim and the defendant’s forum-state
contacts. 298 That is what differentiates specific from general
personal jurisdiction.
Another problem with California’s sliding-scale approach,
according to the Court, is that it transforms specific personal
jurisdiction into a “spurious form of general personal
jurisdiction.” 299 And that is the fatal flaw with pendent claim
jurisdiction: it is also a “spurious form” of general personal
jurisdiction. Pendent claim personal jurisdiction blends the two
types of categories together; it essentially says that a state can
adjudicate claims not sufficiently related to the defendant’s
forum-state contacts without general personal jurisdiction. In
Bristol-Myers, the Court made clear it will not tolerate such
blending. 300
Because specific personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific
inquiry, pendent claim personal jurisdiction is legally dubious.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (emphasis added).
See id.
See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 195, at 1136.
See 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
See id.
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The whole point of pendent claim personal jurisdiction is to
allow jurisdiction over claims that, independently, might not
satisfy the elements of specific personal jurisdiction.
Since Bristol-Myers, however, district courts are taking a range
of approaches to pendent claim personal jurisdiction. Some are
refusing to apply it, others are still partially accepting it, 301 and
some are continuing to apply it as before. 302 As appellate courts
consider pendent claim personal jurisdiction after Bristol-Myers,
it is worth watching whether they will reexamine their
precedents in light of the Court’s decision.
2. Interstate federalism should require a connection between each
claim and the forum state, but not much more
As discussed above, Bristol-Myers establishes, in the name of
interstate federalism, a Fourteenth Amendment rule that state
courts cannot adjudicate a claim unrelated to the defendant’s
forum-state contacts. As long as the process of the district courts
remains tethered to state law, the federal courts will often be
subject to the same interstate federalism limitations on personal
jurisdiction as the state courts. That reality adds urgency to the
unresolved question of how broad the relatedness element is.
Although the Court did not decide in Bristol-Myers how broad
the relatedness element is, it gave some clues.
As discussed above, the Court required that there be some
relationship between the claim and the defendant’s forum-state
contacts. But how much of a relationship is required? The Court
declined BMS’s invitation to establish a “proximate cause” test
for relatedness. 303 But the Court also gave clues as to what types
of relationships are insufficient, as it rejected those asserted by
California. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in dissent, the outof-state plaintiffs’ claims were related to BMS’s forum-state
301. See Spratley v. FCA U.S. LLC, 3:17-CV-0062, 2017 WL 4023348, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12
2017) (rejecting pendent claim personal jurisdiction in a diversity case but not questioning the
validity of pendent claim personal jurisdiction in nationwide service of process cases).
302. See supra Section I.B.
303. See Brief for Petitioner at 37–46, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137
S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466).
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contacts in a sense; they resulted from conduct by BMS that was
“materially the same” as its activity in California. 304 For Justice
Sotomayor—like the California Supreme Court in
Cornelison 305—this relationship should be sufficient. 306
Aside from rejecting California’s proposed standard, it is
unclear what degree of relatedness the Court will require
between the claim and the defendant’s forum-state contacts.
There are three potential approaches the Court can take. First,
the Court could decline to enforce the requirement, throwing
up its hands and pleading institutional incompetence. The
Court effectively ruled this option out in Bristol-Myers. Second,
the Court could acknowledge the difficulty of developing a
judicially manageable standard and establish a deferential rule
that gives the states (and, by extension, the federal courts)
substantial latitude within limits. Third, the Court could
aggressively police state assertions of personal jurisdiction. I
recommend the second approach, but it is worth considering
the third, which remains open.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Seiferth demonstrates how
courts could aggressively police interstate federalism through
the relatedness element. In Seiferth, where the court had
personal jurisdiction as to three related claims, it declined to
exercise jurisdiction with respect to a defective design claim,
concluding that it did not “arise from” the defendant’s contacts
with Mississippi because the defendant designed the product in
Florida. 307 Standing in isolation, there seems to be some
relationship between the defective design claim and
Mississippi. The product—which was designed in Florida—
injured someone in Mississippi. Mississippi certainly seems to
have some interest in regulating the design of a product that
ultimately killed someone within its borders. Implicitly,
Seiferth’s relatedness element balanced the interests of
Mississippi and Florida, privileging Florida’s potentially
304.
305.
306.
307.

See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See 16 Cal. 3d 143, 146 (1976).
See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
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greater interest in providing a forum 308 and applying its own
substantive law. 309 Here, the Fifth Circuit essentially umpired
between Florida and Mississippi, determining Florida was the
better fit.
Although the Court could aggressively police interstate
federalism through the relatedness element, the Court’s choiceof-law jurisprudence demonstrates why it should not do so.
Within the choice-of-law realm, there was a longstanding
debate on whether the Constitution gave federal courts the
authority to balance between competing state interests to strike
down a state’s application of its own law. 310 Although the Court
once blessed a balancing of state interests in evaluating a state’s
application of its own law, 311 it backtracked four years later,
suggesting that a state can apply its own law as long as it has
an interest in the claim. 312 In part, the Court’s decision seems
308. This Article deliberately focuses on the power to provide a forum, rather than the
power of a state to have its substantive law applied. Different states have different choice-oflaw rules, and it is possible the federal court in Seiferth, applying Mississippi’s choice of law
rules, would have ultimately applied Florida substantive law to the defective design claim.
However, there are many situations where a forum state will, for public policy reasons, choose
to apply its own law, perhaps because it thinks its public policy is better. See Brilmayer, supra
note 205, at 83 n.9. Because the Supreme Court has developed minimal constitutional limitations
on a forum state’s application of its own substantive law, such choices will rarely be struck
down. See id. Another potential interstate federalism concern is that states have an interest in
developing their own substantive law rather than letting other states do so. See David A. Skeel,
The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 1, 20–21 (2017) (arguing the Delaware
legislature has taken several steps to ensure Delaware courts apply the state’s own corporate
law, including passing a statute only allowing exclusive forum clauses in corporate charters or
bylaws if they include Delaware as a forum).
309. Florida would, presumably, apply its own substantive law. But denying personal
jurisdiction to Mississippi does not guarantee that Florida will get to provide a forum or apply
its own substantive law. Instead, the plaintiff could sue the defendant in his home state,
Tennessee, which could then presumably apply its substantive law to the dispute within
constitutional bounds.
310. See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1945) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires federal courts
to “impose uniformity in choice of law problems” because it was designed “to federalize the
separate and independent state legal systems by the overriding principle of reciprocal
recognition”); KAY ET AL., supra note 143, at 359–64.
311. See Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 549–50 (1935)
(“[California’s] interest is sufficient to justify its legislation and is greater than that of
Alaska . . . .”).
312. See Pacific Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 503 (1939)
(“Although Massachusetts has an interest in safeguarding the compensation of Massachusetts
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motivated by a lack of a judicially manageable standard to
evaluate competing claims. 313 Further, although federal
policing of state choice-of-law decisions might promote more
equality between states, it would subject state assertions of
jurisdiction to an open-ended balancing test, creating a
“diminution of state power.” 314 Consequently, in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague, the Court adopted the deferential,
judicially manageable rule that a state could apply its own law
to a claim as long as the state has “significant” contacts with
it. 315 This rule adequately protects interstate federalism—
forbidding overreach by states to adjudicate claims they have
no interest in—while adopting a judicially manageable
standard that avoids undermining the power of all the states.
Taking a lesson from Allstate, the Court should use personal
jurisdiction’s relatedness element to ensure the forum state’s
court has a regulatory interest in adjudicating the claims before
it. 316 Indeed, one can interpret International Shoe as an attempt
ensure that the forum state has a regulatory interest in the
suit. 317 The term “regulatory interest” is admittedly vague; it
employees while temporarily abroad in the course of their employment, and may adopt that
policy for itself, that could hardly be thought to support an application of the full faith and
credit clause which would override the constitutional authority of another state to legislative
for the bodily safety and economic protection of employees injured within it.”).
313. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495–96 (2003) (explaining that the balancing
approach of Alaska Packers “quickly proved unsatisfactory” and that “[i]n light of this
experience, we abandoned the balancing of interests approach”). But see Kermit Roosevelt III,
The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2528–29 (1999) (proposing
a deferential non-discrimination standard for policing state choice-of-law decisions).
314. Elliot E. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581, 588 (1953).
315. See 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (“[F]or a State’s substantive law to be selected in a
constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair.”).
316. The term “regulatory interest” has appeared in the personal jurisdiction context
multiple times. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part) (“State courts have legitimately read their jurisdiction expansively when a cause of action
centers in an area in which the forum State possesses a manifest regulatory interest.”); see also
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (explaining that
specific personal jurisdiction principally depends on an “activity or an occurrence that takes
place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.”).
317. Professor Burbank suggests International Shoe can be understood as requiring a state to
have a regulatory interest as part of a due process balancing test. See also Hayward D. Reynolds,
The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies and Persistent Formalist Subversion, 18
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does not automatically decide individual cases. But it conveys
an attitude: the federal courts should not aggressively umpire
between multiple states that have legitimate interests in
adjudicating a claim. Rather, it should be enough that a state
has some regulatory interest. Although the full spectrum of state
interests cannot be catalogued, most are connected with the
state’s police power: protecting those within its borders. As
with other deferential tests, like the Fourteenth Amendment’s
rational basis test, courts should proceed cautiously before
concluding a state lacks a regulatory interest in a particular
claim. Demanding more is likely not judicially manageable. 318
Under this test, a Mississippi court should be able to adjudicate
the defective design claim presented in Seiferth, as Mississippi
undoubtedly had a regulatory interest in regulating machinery
injuring people within its borders, even if it was designed outof-state. This rule is faithful to Bristol-Myers; it ensures that a
state with no legitimate interest in adjudicating a claim will not
do so. 319 It also limits the judiciary’s line-drawing challenge and
avoids unduly diminishing the power of the state courts.
3. Pendent claim personal jurisdiction is often unnecessary.
As Section IV.B.1 demonstrates, Bristol-Myers instructs that
specific personal jurisdiction requires each claim in a lawsuit be
related to the forum state. Because the whole point of pendent
claim personal jurisdiction is that an independent relationship
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 854 (1991) (describing personal jurisdiction rules as a form of
procedural due process). There is some support for this view. The Court started with the
acknowledgment that a defendant’s presence in a state is what traditionally gave its courts
power to issue a binding judgment, because the state had regulatory power over those within
its borders. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). But, as the Court went on
to explain, a corporation’s presence in a state can only be manifested by the actions of its agents
within. Id. at 317. Thus, “the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize those
activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process.” Id. at 316–17. This language suggests the Court envisioned
a due process balancing test where contacts weighed in the calculus.
318. Courts have long established doctrinal tests recognizing their limited institutional
competence. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 29 (1953) (deferentially reviewing
congressional action under the Tax Clause because “a final definition of the line between state
and federal power has baffled judges and legislators”).
319. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
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with the forum state is not required for each claim, the doctrine
is forbidden. However, it is also sometimes unnecessary. In the
situations where courts might be most tempted to apply
pendent claim personal jurisdiction, they could instead
consider more carefully whether specific personal jurisdiction
independently exists as to the “pendent” claims.
Courts, state and federal, are currently divided on what the
proper test for the relatedness element is. 320 Some courts apply
a relatively demanding standard, requiring the defendant’s
forum-state contacts be a proximate cause of the claim. Other
courts apply a relaxed but-for standard, which usually allows
personal jurisdiction as long as an event relevant to the lawsuit
took place in the forum state. Others have staked out a middle
ground. The Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers does not establish
a uniform standard, leaving this diversity in place for now.
Whatever a jurisdiction’s particular test is, courts that may be
tempted to resort to pendent claim personal jurisdiction should
first ask whether it is even necessary. If one of the plaintiff’s
claims is related to the forum state, and the other claims arise
from the same nucleus of operative fact, then the other claims
may have a sufficiently close relationship with the forum state
to independently justify specific personal jurisdiction. Outside
the nationwide service of process cases, the first condition must
be true, and most courts applying pendent claim personal
jurisdiction already require the second condition as well. 321
To see how this will sometimes be the case, consider again the
facts of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Seiferth. Camus, an
engineer, designed a helicopter platform for his employer, Air2.
Although Camus designed the platform in Florida, he
transported it to Mississippi and, while there, installed it on
Air2’s helicopter. 322 The plaintiff, an inspector, died after the
platform broke in Mississippi. The plaintiff’s estate then
brought four claims—defective design, failure to warn,

320. See supra notes 199–208 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
322. See Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2006).
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negligence, and negligence per se—in a Mississippi federal
court. 323 The Fifth Circuit ultimately found specific personal
jurisdiction existed as to the failure to warn, negligence, and
negligence per se claims, but it determined the Fourteenth
Amendment barred jurisdiction as to the defective design
claim. 324 Justifying its conclusion that the claim was not
sufficiently related to the defendant’s forum state contacts, the
court observed that Camus had designed the platform in
Florida, not Mississippi.
However, this analysis may be too stingy. Under the
Mississippi Products Liability Act, which governed the
defective design claim, the plaintiff must prove (among other
things) that “the product failed to perform as expected.” 325 In
this case, the platform failed to perform as expected in
Mississippi, the forum state. Thus, Camus’s forum-state
contacts are an important part of the plaintiff’s defective design
claim, and under any existing relatedness standard, the federal
court probably could have adjudicated this entire case without
pendent claim personal jurisdiction.
For another example, consider our ongoing hypothetical.326
The court would have specific personal jurisdiction as to
Capias’s fraud claim, since the effects of the fraud were felt in
the forum state. But what about the breach of contract claim?
Admittedly, the contract was negotiated entirely in Virginia, so
that state likely has the strongest nexus with the claim. But one
element of a breach of contract claim is the question of whether
a breach occurred. Even if the fact is not vigorously disputed,
the number of computers shipped to California by
RespondendCo is relevant to determining whether a breach
occurred, so those shipments are arguably a but-for cause of the
breach of contract claim. The visits to California by
RespondendCo’s representatives are also pertinent to the
question of breach. Thus, in at least some jurisdictions, the
323.
324.
325.
326.

See id. at 274.
See id. at 275.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (2013).
See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
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breach of contract claim does arise from the defendant’s forumstate contacts, and pendent claim personal jurisdiction would
be entirely unnecessary. Indeed, in the real-life version of the
case, the Ninth Circuit (reversing the district court) concluded
specific personal jurisdiction did exist independently for the
breach of contract claim, making it unnecessary to resort to
pendent claim personal jurisdiction. 327
Seiferth and the hypothetical demonstrate that pendent claim
personal jurisdiction will sometimes not be necessary to
adjudicate a group of claims where an anchor claim is clearly
related to the defendant’s forum-state contacts and the other
claims are related to the anchor claim. Intuitively, that makes
sense. If A is related to B, and B is related to C, there is likely at
least some nexus between A and C. In other words, before
federal courts consider employing a tool not properly available
to them, they should ask if they can exercise jurisdiction under
established doctrine.
Of course, this analysis does not apply to cases where a
nationwide service of process provision authorized the court’s
jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to an anchor claim,
and the anchor claim is not otherwise related to the defendant’s
forum-state contacts. Recall the facts of ESAB, where the South
Carolina federal court used pendent claim personal jurisdiction
to adjudicate state-law claims with no connection to South
Carolina. 328 There, the anchor claim was a RICO claim (so
personal jurisdiction was authorized by a nationwide service of
process provision), yet none of the pertinent events that made
up that claim occurred in South Carolina. Thus, the related
state-law claims were also, unsurprisingly, entirely
unconnected with South Carolina. This Article has argued that
the South Carolina federal court lacked authority to adjudicate
the pendent claims in this case.
But I also submit that this is a good policy outcome. Because
none of the events in this case involved South Carolina—the
327. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287–89, 1289 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977).
328. See ESAB Grp., Inc., v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625–26 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Fourth Circuit acknowledged the defendant did not have
minimum contacts there 329—South Carolina lacked any
regulatory interest in the state-law claims. Further, it made no
sense to burden South Carolina’s people—for example, through
jury duty—in adjudicating claims unconnected to their state. 330
In contrast, it made good sense to adjudicate all of the Seiferth
plaintiff’s claims in Mississippi. First, jurisdiction would be
consistent with Bristol-Myers’ twin commands that specific
personal jurisdiction be claim-specific, and that each claim have
some connection to the forum state. Second, Mississippi had a
clear regulatory interest in the case. A man was killed by
Camus’s design within its territory, implicating the state’s
strong interest in preserving public safety. 331 This case is thus
different than Bristol-Myers, where the Court concluded that
California had “little legitimate interest” in the out-of-state
plaintiffs’ claims. 332 Third, burdening the local Mississippi
community with the costs of adjudicating the claim is
appropriate; a community’s interest in adjudicating a dispute
implicating its safety is undeniably strong.
In response, one could argue that, because the product was
designed in Florida, Florida had an even stronger regulatory
interest that might justify the Fifth Circuit’s decision to reserve
adjudication of the plaintiff’s defective design claim to it. But
the Court long ago discovered the difficulties inherent in
policing between states’ competing interests in the choice-oflaw context. 333 Moreover, choosing between multiple states
with solid regulatory interests in adjudicating a claim would
require a blurry and manipulable standard that puts state court
assertions of personal jurisdiction at the mercy of federal law.

329. See id. at 625–26.
330. Cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (“Jury duty is a burden that ought
not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.”).
331. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 338 n.5 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The
State does have an interest in the safety of motorists who use its roads.”).
332. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
333. See supra notes 310–15 and accompanying text.
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Such a rule, justified by interstate federalism’s solicitude for the
states, would come at a high cost if it demeaned them all.
CONCLUSION
In Bristol-Myers, the Court finally addressed the meaning of
the relatedness requirement, the last element of specific
personal jurisdiction that was mostly undefined. If nothing else,
the Court’s opinion signals that the relatedness element has
teeth, and litigants are already trying to find ways around it.
One method is pendent party personal jurisdiction, which a
substantial number of courts have embraced. Yet the Court’s
opinion also sets the stage to overturn decades of pendent claim
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the federal courts. If
accepted, this Article’s analysis upends both types of pendent
personal jurisdiction, creating several important implications.
First, pendent party personal jurisdiction is plainly
inconsistent with Bristol-Myers. This is true in both federal and
state courts. Further, the rule should not vary for class actions.
Although the combination of limited statutory authority for
service of process and the Court’s personal jurisdiction
decisions is putting pressure on multistate class actions in the
federal courts, pendent party personal jurisdiction should not
be used to circumvent the law. If the current law is unwise,
Congress can always broaden the scope of the federal courts’
personal jurisdiction by extending the scope of their process.
Second, state long-arm statutes are the only current, viable
source of authority for pendent claim personal jurisdiction.
Pendent claim personal jurisdiction is illegitimate in any state
with a long-arm statute that does not authorize it, so the federal
courts must articulate a basis under state law to exercise it.
Federal precedents based on assertions of personal jurisdiction
in states without full-extent statutes are dubious. The rationale
of precedents like Hargrave—a case where the Second Circuit
did not articulate a basis in state law when exercising pendent
claim personal jurisdiction—should be rejected.
Third, pendent claim personal jurisdiction in nationwide
service of process cases will usually fail Bristol-Myers’ rule. The
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nationwide service of process statutes cannot be fairly read to
authorize it, which means jurisdiction must be consistent with
state long-arm statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because these cases frequently involve pendent claims with no
connection to the forum state, Bristol-Myers does not permit
jurisdiction for such claims. Consequently, this Article
challenges the viability of precedents allowing pendent claim
personal jurisdiction in nationwide service of process cases—
for example, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in ESAB.
Fourth, in states with full-extent long-arm statutes, specific
personal jurisdiction will sometimes be possible over a group
of related claims where one claim is related to the defendant’s
forum-state contacts. If a court, understandably, wants to
adjudicate these claims together, it should carefully consider
whether each claim is sufficiently related to the defendant’s
forum-state contacts. In such cases, where the argument for
pendent claim personal jurisdiction would seem most
appealing, it may be unnecessary. For example, specific
personal jurisdiction as to all the claims should be possible in
Seiferth and our ongoing hypothetical.
Finally, this Article urges caution as the courts continue
developing personal jurisdiction law. As the Court’s choice-oflaw jurisprudence demonstrates, it is not wise to use
constitutional law, a blunt instrument, to aggressively police
between states’ competing adjudicative interests. While the line
in Bristol-Myers seems easily enforceable, the Court should
hesitate before demanding a relationship stronger than some
relationship. Even in the status quo, the Court’s recent personal
jurisdiction decisions are undoubtedly putting pressure on
various forms of aggregation in complex litigation, particularly
multistate class actions. The lower federal courts, however, lack
the authority to counter these pressures by ignoring the
Supreme Court’s rules or expanding their jurisdiction beyond
what Congress has authorized. Even if the status quo is
unfortunate, pendent personal jurisdiction is not the answer.

